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THE DELAWARE DELUSION*
ROBERT ANDERSON IV** & JEFFREY MANNS***
Delaware dominates the market for company incorporations,
which places America’s second smallest state in charge of
determining the corporate governance framework for most
public and private companies. The unresolved question is the
basis for Delaware’s appeal compared to other states. We set out
to test empirically the two leading schools of thought, which hold
that Delaware’s appeal lies either in its superior legal regime that
enhances shareholder value more than other states or in
Delaware’s protectionist appeal in adding “managerial value” by
entrenching corporate managers at shareholders’ expense. We
apply an innovative technique to show empirically that both the
“race to the top” and “race to the bottom” schools of thought are
based on false assumptions because Delaware law neither adds
nor subtracts significant value compared to other states.
Our “merger reincorporation” approach leverages the fact that
each interstate merger is actually a reincorporation of the
disappearing company’s assets to the state of incorporation of the
surviving company. This fact creates the opportunity to gauge the
market’s assessment of the value of Delaware law relative to that
of other states by comparing the pre- and post-acquisition value
of acquirers and targets in a cross-section of intra- and interstate
mergers. We analyzed an eleven-year data set of mergers (from
2001 to 2011) and found that financial markets place no
economically consequential value on Delaware law relative to
that of other states, which contradicts both of the leading schools
of thought.
This result suggests that lawyers are engaging in default decision
making based on Delaware’s past preeminence, rather than
actively weighing the value added by Delaware compared to
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what other states could offer to their clients. Lawyers appear to
turn to Delaware because it is the law they are most familiar with;
they assume markets value Delaware law, and they regard
Delaware as a safe default that does not trigger pushback from
corporate managers. To break up herding effects among lawyers
and spur lawyers to assess this opportunity to add value to
transactions, we argue for a “shareholder say” on the state of
incorporation. Empowering shareholders to vote on retaining or
changing the state of incorporation would subject this decision to
greater scrutiny and give shareholders the opportunity to address
this principal-agent failure. This approach would dampen
Delaware-centric herding and foster greater state competition.
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INTRODUCTION
The choice of where to incorporate a company should be one of
the most significant decisions a company’s managers and its lawyers
make. This decision determines the corporate governance framework
to which the company is subject. But the scandal of corporate
governance is that this choice appears to be a default decision because
of Delaware’s dominance of the incorporation market. Corporate
lawyers routinely embrace the widespread, yet unproven assumption
that Delaware’s corporate governance framework is better than that
of other states and steer their clients towards Delaware.1
This core, unresolved question is the basis for Delaware’s appeal,
which has sparked two leading schools of thought. “Race to the top”
advocates believe Delaware has won a competition among the states
in producing a statutory framework and specialized court system that
enhances shareholder value.2 In contrast, “race to the bottom”
1. Approximately 60% of publicly traded companies in the United States are
incorporated in Delaware, including 63% of the Fortune 500 companies. See DEL. DEP’T
OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPS., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2010) [hereinafter DEL. ANNUAL
REPORT], available at http://corp.delaware.gov/2009ar.pdf. Over 90% of publicly traded
companies that are incorporated in a state outside of their principal base of operations are
incorporated in Delaware. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions
Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 391, 420 (2003).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 306–07 (2d ed. 1977)
(arguing that Delaware’s appetite for tax revenues from corporate charters incentivized it
to develop efficient corporate law rules); RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE
CORPORATION 28–42 (1978) (developing the “race to the top” argument in greater
detail); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory
of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 184–90 (1985) (arguing that companies “will select their
state of incorporation adaptively” leading to a “race to the top” among states); Robert
Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527–31 (2001)
(analyzing the Tobin’s Q of Delaware corporations versus non-Delaware corporations to
argue that incorporation in Delaware adds value); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the
Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporate Law, 76
NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919–20 (1982) (pointing to the greater market valuation of Delaware
versus non-Delaware firms in arguing that Delaware “has achieved its prominent position
because its permissive corporation law maximizes, rather than minimizes, shareholders’
welfare”); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 265–73 (1985) (arguing that the positive market reaction to
reincorporations in Delaware suggests that state competition results in a “race to the
top”); Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32,
35–38 (2004) (applying the Tobin’s Q approach to show that Delaware law adds a modest,
though declining amount of value compared to other states); Ralph K. Winter, State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 289–92
(1977) (arguing that state competition results in a “race to the top”); Michal Barzuza &
David C. Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law 24–25, 52 (Va. Law
and Econ., Working Paper No. 2011-08), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1644974
(finding there is a premium for Delaware incorporation based on a comparison of the
Tobin’s Q of Delaware and Nevada corporations).
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advocates argue that Delaware law is best at adding managerial value
and entrenching managers at the expense of shareholders.3 This
Article puts Delaware’s appeal to the test. We apply an innovative
empirical approach comparing the value added from merger
incorporation decisions that allows us to examine and debunk the
assumptions underpinning both of these viewpoints on Delaware’s
allure. We show that Delaware law does not add to or subtract
significant value from publicly traded companies.
This empirical finding suggests that Delaware’s appeal is driven
by lawyers’ default decision making based on Delaware’s past
preeminence and reflects lawyers’ failure to assess the value added by
Delaware compared to other states. Whatever Delaware’s past
advantages may have been, faith and path dependence, rather than
actual value added, supports its current hegemony. This conclusion
raises the question of how to incentivize managers and lawyers to

3. See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558–59 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(framing the competition among states for incorporation revenues as a race “not of
diligence but of laxity”); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION 54–61 (1976) (framing Delaware’s preeminence as a product of catering to
management rather than shareholders); Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian
Bebchuk, The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 134, 137–41
(2006) (developing a formal model that suggests that Delaware law systematically favors
managers over shareholders in contexts where their interests conflict); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1440–45 (1992) [hereinafter Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation] (arguing that “state competition produces a race for the
top with respect to some corporate issues but a race for the bottom with respect to others”
in which managers’ interests conflict with shareholders); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen &
Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1775, 1820–21 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?] (providing empirical evidence that state competition
results in corporate governance rules that benefit managers but potentially at the expense
of shareholders); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 633, 665–66 (1974) (sparking the debate on the efficiency of
Delaware law by arguing Delaware was leading a “race for the bottom”); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187, 209–11 (1983)
(arguing for the need to reexamine corporate law to remedy rules that favor managers at
the expense of shareholders); Richard W. Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law:
Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. LAW. 991, 993–94 (1976) (arguing Delaware favors
managerial over shareholder interests); Stanley A. Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the
Management of the Corporation, 31 BUS. LAW. 883, 885–87 (1976) (framing Delaware as
leading a “race of leniency” towards management); Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and
Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 555–57 (1984) (arguing states compete in a
“race to the bottom” because corporate law systematically favors management over
shareholder interests and that reforms are unlikely because managers will “flee” to other
states); Gordon G. Young, Federal Corporate Law, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 41
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 146, 151 (1977) (arguing Delaware’s appeal lies in its leadership of
the “race to the bottom”).
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scrutinize the value added by Delaware’s corporate governance
framework compared to that of other states in order to create
competition and accountability. The logic is that if corporate
managers and lawyers have incentives to assess the merits of their
incorporation choice, then Delaware and other states will be
incentivized to compete to assess and enhance the quality of their
corporate governance law.
We argue that policymakers should allow shareholders to decide
on the state of incorporation to break up decades of path
development and deference to Delaware. Empowering shareholders
to have a say on the state of incorporation could be accomplished
easily through a statutory change, a Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) regulatory mandate for public companies4 or
through stock-exchange listing rules.5 This market-facilitating
approach would let shareholders decide whether to keep the existing
state of incorporation or to require the company to change. This
strategy would incentivize proxy advisory firms to analyze the merits
of states of incorporation and to recommend to shareholders to retain
or change the state of incorporation.6 This approach would also turn

4. The evolution of shareholder votes on executive compensation provides a road
map of two potential strategies for a “shareholder say” on the state of incorporation.
Advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation initially began at shareholders’
prompting pursuant to SEC Rule 14a-8. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary
Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
323, 337–40 (2009) (discussing the development of U.S. public company shareholder votes
on executive compensation that gained momentum in 2006). The Dodd-Frank Act
transformed optional shareholder votes into a mandate for public companies that must
hold advisory shareholder votes on the top five executives’ compensation at least every
three years. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 951(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 22 U.S.C.); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) (2011) (containing the
SEC rule implementing this provision).
5. One key issue for statutory and regulatory strategies is the question of whether
shareholder “say on incorporation” would be binding on company management. For
example, a state statutory solution could be crafted to empower shareholders to bind
management on this issue, just as an exchange can make companies’ adoption of
provisions for binding shareholder votes a listing requirement. But a regulatory approach,
such as an SEC rule, would be formally nonbinding on management, yet would likely have
a similar impact because management would face strong pressure to comply with
shareholders’ wishes. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There is a
Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30
J. CORP. L. 675, 698–99 (2005) (discussing stock-exchange-listing rule mandates for public
companies to secure shareholder approval for stock option plans).
6. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s
Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1216 (2012) (showing empirically that proxy advisory firm
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on the market test of institutional investors who are weighing the
benefits and costs of investing their energies in changing the state of
incorporation.7 Even simply the potential for shareholder votes on
incorporation would force corporate managers and lawyers to think
through the state of incorporation choice more thoroughly so that
they can justify their decision.
This regulatory strategy would incentivize corporate lawyers to
acquire legal fluency in multiple corporate governance jurisdictions,
rather than to rely solely on their knowledge of the law of Delaware.
The need to justify incorporation decisions to shareholders would
force lawyers to actively assess the value added by Delaware law and
the law of other states, and the acquired fluency has the added virtue
of making it more likely that corporate lawyers will spearhead change
in a proactive way to extract value for companies and their
shareholders. Delaware may continue to serve as the dominant
market for incorporations. The “shareholder say” strategy would
create opportunities for states to compete to attract shareholder
support and foster more robust competition among the states to
enhance the quality of their corporate law.
Part I will provide an overview of the debate between the “race
to the top” and “race to the bottom” schools of thought on Delaware
law. Parts II and III will lay out the merger incorporation test for
assessing the value added from Delaware law compared to other
states and the results of our analysis. Parts IV and V will discuss the
implications of our findings and offer our normative recommendation
to empower shareholders to have a say on incorporation. Lastly, Part
VI will discuss our methodological assumptions and address potential
objections to our approach.
I. ASSESSING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW
A. The Debate on the Basis for Delaware’s Hegemony
Delaware’s dominance of corporate law is indisputable, although
the reasons for its appeal are strongly contested. Delaware charters a
clear majority of publicly traded companies in the United States, even
though almost all publicly traded companies are headquartered in
Institutional Shareholder Services’ recommendations for shareholder votes on executive
compensation had a twenty percent impact in swaying shareholder support or opposition).
7. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962–64 (2010) (discussing how the growth of institutional investors
has increased the plausibility of shareholder activism because of the distinctive incentives
institutional investors face compared to retail investors).
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other states.8 For example, thirteen times more public companies are
incorporated in Delaware than in California, even though
approximately forty-three times more public companies are
headquartered in California than in Delaware.9 Although less than
half a percent of corporate assets are deployed in Delaware,10
Delaware law ultimately undergirds the corporate governance of
most American corporations operating throughout the world.11
But the reason for Delaware’s enduring appeal is an open
question that has divided most corporate law academics into two
conflicting schools of thought. “Race to the top” advocates argue that
lawyers advocate chartering large corporations in Delaware because
it provides more efficient corporate law than other states and
enhances shareholder value.12 In contrast, “race to the bottom”
8. Delaware’s dominance has been sustained for most of the past century as
Delaware has consistently served as the incorporation home of a majority of large publicly
traded companies. See, e.g., Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 135. For example, 97% of
Fortune 500 companies are based outside of Delaware, see Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note
1, at 390–91 tbl.1, while 63% of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware, see
DEL. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
9. These figures are derived from the incorporation data from Bebchuk and Cohen’s
study. Bebchuck & Cohen, supra note 1, at 394–95.
10. Delaware accounted for merely 0.4% of the nation’s GDP in 2011, which
underscores the fact that it is an economic minnow, even though it functions as a corporate
law whale. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Commerce, Bureau of Econ. Analysis,
Widespread Growth Across States in 2011 (June 5, 2012), available at http://www.bea.gov/
newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/2012/pdf/gsp0612.pdf. Many companies have no more
than a nominal street address in Delaware, and many of America’s largest companies
literally share the same Delaware street address. See Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives
as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html?smid=pl-share.
11. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SARBANESOXLEY: UNDERSTANDING HOW SARBANES-OXLEY AFFECTS YOUR BUSINESS 21 (2007)
(describing Delaware as “the Michael Jordan” of corporate law); Jill E. Fisch, Institutional
Competition to Regulate Corporations: A Comment on Macey, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
617, 619 (2005) (describing Delaware as the “dominant supplier” of American corporate
law); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931,
1969 (1991) (“As long as no other state grabs a substantial number of important
corporations, the Delaware Supreme Court remains the national supreme court on
corporate law.”).
12. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 306–07 (arguing that Delaware’s appetite for
tax revenues from corporate charters incentivized it to develop efficient corporate law
rules); Baysinger & Butler, supra note 2, at 184–90 (arguing that companies “will select
their state of incorporation adaptively” leading to a “race to the top” among states);
Daines, supra note 2, at 527–31 (analyzing the Tobin’s Q of Delaware corporations versus
non-Delaware corporations to argue that incorporation in Delaware adds value); Fischel,
supra note 2, at 919–20 (pointing to the greater market valuation of Delaware versus nonDelaware firms in arguing that Delaware “has achieved its prominent position because its
permissive corporation law maximizes, rather than minimizes, shareholders’ welfare”);
Romano, supra note 2, at 265–73 (arguing that the positive market reaction to
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proponents argue that business lawyers embrace Delaware because
its corporate law framework systematically favors managers at the
expense of shareholders.13
The divide between the two schools of thought centers on
conflicting premises about two key questions: (1) the corporate
governance question of why managers incorporate in one state rather
than another and (2) the empirical question of whether Delaware law
increases or decreases firm value relative to the law of other states.14
reincorporations in Delaware suggests that state competition results in a “race to the
top”); Subramanian, supra note 2, at 35–39 (applying the Tobin’s Q approach to show that
Delaware law adds a modest, though declining amount of value compared to other states);
Winter, supra note 2, at 289–92 (arguing that state competition results in a “race to the
top”); Barzuza & Smith, supra note 2, at 24–25 (finding there is a premium for Delaware
incorporation based on a comparison of the Tobin’s Q of Delaware and Nevada
corporations).
13. See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558–59 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(framing the competition among states for incorporation revenues as a race “not of
diligence but of laxity”); NADER ET AL., supra note 3, at 54–61 (framing Delaware’s
preeminence as a product of catering to management rather than shareholders); Bar-Gill
et al., supra note 3, at 137–40 (developing a formal model that suggests that Delaware law
systematically favors managers over shareholders in contexts where their interests
conflict); Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation, supra note 3, at 1440–45 (arguing that
“state competition produces a race for the top with respect to some corporate issues but a
race for the bottom with respect to others” in which managers’ interests conflict with
shareholders); Bebchuck et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, supra note 3, at 1820–21 (2002) (providing empirical evidence that state
competition results in corporate governance rules that benefit managers but potentially at
the expense of shareholders); Cary, supra note 3, at 665–66 (sparking the debate on the
efficiency of Delaware law by arguing Delaware was leading a “race for the bottom”);
Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 209–211 (arguing for the need to reexamine corporate law to
remedy rules that favor managers at the expense of shareholders); Jennings, supra note 3,
at 993–94 (arguing Delaware favors managerial over shareholder interests); Kaplan, supra
note 3, at 885–87 (framing Delaware as leading a “race of leniency” towards
management); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 555–57 (arguing states compete in a race to the
bottom because corporate law systematically favors management over shareholder
interests and that reforms are unlikely because managers will “flee” to other states);
Young, supra note 3, at 151 (arguing Delaware’s appeal lies in its leadership of the “race
to the bottom”).
14. In addition to these polar opposite positions, there are some alternative
perspectives worth noting. One view rejects the idea that competition for incorporation
exists on the grounds that other states are not attempting to attract charters. See, e.g.,
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 679, 685–87 (2002). This view is at least partly contradicted by the express efforts
of states to compete, such as Nevada (however unsuccessfully). See, e.g., Michal Barzuza,
Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV.
935, 938–40 (2012) (discussing Nevada’s efforts to attract out-of-state incorporations and
its limited success); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal
Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 961–62 (2001) (“The choice [of where
to incorporate] available to corporations . . . has generated competition among states for
incorporations.”). Another perspective argues that corporate law is made up primarily of
default rules and is therefore “trivial.” See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?, 84
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These two questions are distinct yet are inextricably intertwined. If
Delaware law increases firm value, then the reason many companies
incorporate there is straightforward, but the reason almost half of
large companies do not incorporate there would be more complex. In
contrast, if Delaware decreases firm value, then the incorporation
decision reflects severe agency costs in corporate governance, and
lawyers and corporate managers trade off a “Delaware discount” in
exchange for securing managers greater autonomy from shareholders.
Lastly, if Delaware is no better or worse than other states, factors
other than the quality of corporate law likely underpin the
incorporation decision, a fact which would take the Delaware debate
in an entirely different direction. As a result, the stakes of this debate
are far more important than the mere question of whether Delaware
preeminence is a product of a “race to the top” or a “race to the
bottom.” Understanding whether markets value Delaware law
relative to that of other states is an important piece of evidence in
resolving broader questions about agency problems in corporate law.
The fundamental disagreements between the two camps have
masked a significant shared assumption—that Delaware law differs in
economically consequential ways from that of other states.15 As a
result, both groups have largely skirted the more fundamental
question of whether corporate law matters at all to financial
NW. U. L. REV. 542, 584–86 (1990). This view understates the role of institutions in
mediating both the default corporate laws and adjudicating disputes. See, e.g., Marcel
Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1599–1600 (2005) (discussing the significance of the coordination
between the Delaware judiciary and legislature in addressing corporate law issues); Mark
J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 594–95 (2003) (discussing the
significance of Delaware’s legal decision-makers’ quick responses to trends and issues in
corporate law); Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, The Feds, and the Stock Exchange:
Challenges to the First State as First in Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779, 783–84
(2004) (discussing the appeal of Delaware’s judiciary in resolving corporate governance
litigation issues). Lastly, William Carney has compiled survey data from underwriter and
issuer lawyers that suggests that lawyers generally recommend either Delaware or their
state of practice for incorporation because they only are familiar with the corporate law of
Delaware and their state of practice. See William J. Carney, George B. Shepherd &
Joanna Shepherd Bailey, Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware Corporate
Law, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 123, 124–25 (2012). Our analysis of market valuations of intraand interstate mergers builds on this insight by arguing that Delaware’s dominance is not a
product of markets placing any value on incorporating in Delaware, but rather reflects
herding effects among lawyers coupled with path dependence from Delaware’s past
preeminence.
15. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 471–72 (1987) (arguing that
Delaware’s appeal lies both in “the present structure of its rules, and—perhaps more
importantly—for the reliable promise it makes that rules adopted in the future will also be
highly desired”).
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markets.16 In other words, do markets value the quality of corporate
law in that they “price” the corporate law of states that firms choose?
Do they apply a premium or discount to corporations simply for
incorporating in a state whose corporate law is perceived to add or
reduce value? Or is corporate law a matter of relative indifference to
markets given the ability of corporations to contract around many
rules?
Given the stakes (and potential arbitrage opportunities), one
would expect that this debate would have been definitively resolved
long ago. If simply reincorporating in Delaware could significantly
increase the value of a firm, it would seem almost to verge on
malpractice for corporate counsel not to push corporate managers to
incorporate there. Or why would the firms that fail to reincorporate
in Delaware not become appealing takeover targets or at least
become comparatively more so on the margins? The opposite logic
would apply to the extent that the “race to the bottom” advocates are
correct. One would expect markets to impose a discount on
companies incorporating in Delaware compared to those
incorporating in stronger corporate law regimes.
The reason these questions remain unanswered is that both
competing schools of thought have failed to produce definitive
evidence about whether Delaware corporate law is better or worse
than that of other states or even whether differences in state
corporate law matter at all. Although scholars have conducted
numerous empirical studies on the market value of state
incorporation, the studies are almost completely inconclusive on the
fundamental question of whether corporate law matters to financial
markets.17 The earliest papers conducted event studies around
reincorporation transactions and had weak results, generally finding a
small positive effect of reincorporating in Delaware.18 More recent
studies have taken a different approach, examining the Tobin’s Q of
Delaware corporations versus non-Delaware corporations, with some

16. A notable exception is Bernard Black’s view that corporate law is made up
primarily of default rules and is therefore “trivial.” See Black, supra note 14, at 584–86.
17. Compare Daines, supra note 2, at 527–31 (arguing that Delaware law enhances
shareholder value), and Romano, supra note 2, at 265–73 (arguing that state competition
results in a “race to the top”), with Bebchuck et al., Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?, supra note 3, at 1820–21 (arguing that Delaware law is
biased in favor of managers), and Subramanian, supra note 2, at 35–38 (showing that
Delaware law adds a modest, though declining amount of value at best).
18. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 2, at 265–73 (finding that reincorporation is
sometimes associated with positive abnormal returns for shareholders).
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finding a strong positive effect from Delaware law19 and others
finding only evidence of a weak (or historical) positive effect.20
Although the existing literature seems to have established that
Delaware is not significantly worse than other states, it also has not
produced much evidence that Delaware is better. Thus, the debate
has “stalemated,”21 largely because scholars have failed to move
beyond the limitations of these two methodological techniques.
In this Article, we attempt to break this stalemate by using a new
approach to assess the value added from incorporating in Delaware.
Our technique, which we call the “merger reincorporation approach,”
takes advantage of the fact that every merger between companies
incorporated in different states is, in effect, a reincorporation of the
target company. In these “merger reincorporations,” the target’s
assets are redeployed from one legal regime (that of the target) to
another (that of the acquirer), effectively reincorporating the target.
If the new state of incorporation is more valuable than the old legal
regime, then the reincorporation should create value in the merger
relative to mergers in which the law stayed the same (or became
worse due to migration to less efficient state regimes).
We collected over a decade’s worth of data on these merger
reincorporations to determine whether value is created or destroyed
when assets are brought under Delaware law relative to acquisitions
when assets remain under the same legal regime or are brought under
non-Delaware law. If markets place a higher value on Delaware law
relative to non-Delaware law, then merger reincorporations should
create more value (or destroy less) when a Delaware corporation
acquires a non-Delaware corporation than when a non-Delaware
corporation acquires a Delaware corporation. Our merger
reincorporation approach provides a new test of the market value of
Delaware law that will help to break the deadlock in the empirical
literature.
We examine a sample of over 600 acquisition transactions from
public companies (from eleven years of public company mergers from
2001 to 2011) and find that the conventional wisdom that Delaware
corporate law is better than that of other states is a myth. We find

19. See, e.g., Daines, supra note 2, at 533 (finding that incorporating in Delaware
added approximately five percent to firm value compared to incorporating in other states).
20. See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 2, at 33–38 (applying the Tobin’s Q approach to
show that Delaware law adds a modest, though declining, amount of value compared to
other states).
21. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 14, at 634 (arguing that the longstanding debate between
the “race to the top” and “race to the bottom” has devolved into a stalemate).
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that the “excess returns”22 when Delaware companies merge into
non-Delaware companies are almost identical to those when nonDelaware companies merge into Delaware companies. The excess
returns in both of these contexts are also roughly equal to cases in
which Delaware companies merge with Delaware companies.
Redeploying assets from a non-Delaware state to Delaware does not
significantly increase the value of those assets, and redeploying assets
from Delaware law to another state’s law does not significantly
reduce the value of those assets. The empirical evidence shows that
financial markets appear to place little to no value on Delaware law
relative to that of other states and that both the “race to the top” and
“race to the bottom” schools of thought rest on false assumptions.
The evidence leads us to consider explanations other than
efficiency to explain Delaware’s dominance in the incorporation
market. In contrast to the contentions of both the “race to the top”
theorists and the “race to the bottom” theorists, we argue that the
content of Delaware law—whether positive or negative—has little to
do with most corporations’ choices to incorporate there. Instead, we
argue that the empirical evidence suggests that legal herding and path
dependence are at the heart of Delaware’s continued dominance in
spite of Delaware law’s failure to add value. Lawyers appear to turn
to Delaware because it is the law they know best and because it is a
safe default to recommend without conducting due diligence since a
majority of companies are based there. Lawyers assume markets
value Delaware law, but lawyers’ recommendations appear to have
nothing to do with whether Delaware law actually adds value
compared to other states’ corporate frameworks.
B.

The Prior Literature on Delaware’s Appeal

The conventional wisdom among corporate scholars is that
Delaware’s appeal to business lawyers and corporate managers stems
from a century-long sorting process in which Delaware edged out all
other states by competing with other states over corporate law.23 This
competition is made possible by the fact that corporate law in the
United States is a state law matter. Corporations can choose to
incorporate in any of the fifty states regardless of where their
22. “Excess returns” are the combined increase in value of the target and acquirer
following the disclosure of a merger above the normal returns.
23. See CHRISTOPHER GRANDY, NEW JERSEY AND THE FISCAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW 33–53 (1993) (discussing how New Jersey was
initially the destination of choice for incorporations, yet was supplanted by Delaware due
to a backlash to 1911 New Jersey legislation that placed limits on corporate management).
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headquarters or principal place of operations is located.24 Therefore,
if one state provides a more attractive corporate law regime than
another, companies would presumably choose the more favorable
regime in the first place or reincorporate there later. According to the
standard story, Delaware has won the “race” because it has provided
more attractive corporate law than its competitors.25
The key dispute dividing scholars, however, is the question:
“attractive to whom?”26 Scholars embracing the “race to the top”
view disagree with those advocating the “race to the bottom”
perspective not on whether Delaware is better, but for whom
Delaware is “better.” Both believe corporate law matters and that
states compete in a “race” by providing law that is better for
somebody, but disagree about the mechanism of competition and the
beneficiary of the competition.27 “Race to the top” theorists tend to
believe that capital market discipline will lead companies to migrate
to the most efficient law and that business lawyers and corporate
managers naturally gravitate to the regime that maximizes
shareholder value.28 In contrast, “race to the bottom” theorists
believe business lawyers look out for their clients—corporate
managers—and, therefore, understandably choose the legal regime
that benefits the managers the most.29 The point of contention is
whether Delaware’s preeminence is the result of a virtuous attempt to

24. The significance of corporate incorporation is due to the “internal affairs
doctrine,” which specifies that the law of the state of incorporation applies to the “internal
affairs” of the corporation, such as corporate governance. See William J. Carney, The
Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 312–18
(1997).
25. Winning the race produces tangible benefits for Delaware. See, e.g., Kahan &
Kamar, supra note 14, at 688–95 (discussing the range of benefits Delaware and Delaware
lawyers derive from Delaware’s preeminence in corporate chartering). For example, in
2001, Delaware’s corporate franchise tax revenues amounted to $750 per Delaware
resident, which serves as a substantial tax revenue source. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over
Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 583 (2002); see also DEL. ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 1, at 2 (detailing that in 2009, Delaware collected $767 million in business-related fees
accounting for twenty-five percent of the state’s budget).
26. See George W. Dent, Jr., For Optional Federal Incorporation, 35 J. CORP. L. 499,
505 (2010).
27. Compare Choi & Guzman, supra note 14, at 961 (arguing that states compete for
corporate charters), with Kahan & Kamar, supra note 14, at 688–95 (arguing that
Delaware’s preeminence means that states can no longer effectively compete for state
incorporation).
28. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 2, at 254–58 (arguing that constraints imposed by
capital markets make the “race to the bottom” argument implausible).
29. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 3, at 885; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 557; Young, supra
note 3, at 151.
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design law and governance institutions that seek to maximize firm
value or the result of a defective market failure that promotes
manager entrenchment and self-interest. The question is whether the
race is a competition toward efficiency or a process that reflects and
reinforces deep pathologies in corporate governance.30
The response of financial markets to Delaware corporate law is
either explicitly or implicitly a central part of both sides’ arguments.
“Race to the top” proponents explicitly rely on the market as the
mechanism that motivates lawyers and managers to embrace efficient
corporate law.31 The underlying logic is that markets will price
corporate law, penalizing corporations that incorporate in suboptimal
jurisdictions and rewarding firms that choose efficient corporate law
frameworks. This capital markets penalty will create headwinds for
firms that choose less efficient state law, causing the stock price to
drop and making the company vulnerable to a takeover.32 This view’s
logic holds that Delaware would have no interest in this fate befalling
its corporations for fear of losing both prestige and its lucrative
franchise tax revenue.33 Therefore, Delaware would not have
incentives to implement or keep law that favors management over
shareholders. As a result, this school of thought argues that
Delaware’s dominance relies on market pricing of corporate law to
stimulate regulatory competition toward the most efficient corporate
rules.34
30. See Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for
Corporate Governance? 1–10 (Yale Law Sch. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Pol’y, Working
Paper No. 307, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=693484 (arguing that the current
state of corporate law is still best explained by robust competition).
31. It is important to emphasize that “race to the top” proponents do not assume that
managers are always acting as faithful agents of shareholders in maximizing shareholder
value as they recognize the divergence between managers’ and shareholders’ interests. See
Fischel, supra note 2, at 919. Instead, their notion of efficiency is a relative question and
focuses on markets incentivizing managers to seek institutional arrangements, such as
corporate law or corporate finance frameworks, that are superior to the alternatives and
that the overall benefits exceed the costs. See id. (discussing how market pressures limit
managers’ ability to deviate from shareholders’ interests and push them to maximize
shareholder value); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 327–28
(1976) (discussing the role of markets in the choice of institutional frameworks).
32. See, e.g., WINTER, supra note 2, at 10–11 (“It is not in the interest of Delaware
corporate management or the Delaware treasury for corporations chartered there to be at
a disadvantage in raising debt or equity capital in relation to corporations chartered in
other states.”).
33. See Cary, supra note 3, at 684 (arguing that “there is no public policy left in
Delaware corporate law except the objective of raising revenue”).
34. See, e.g., Daines, supra note 2, at 532–35 (analyzing the Tobin’s Q of Delaware
corporations versus non-Delaware corporations to argue that incorporation in Delaware
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“Race to the bottom” proponents often do not rely explicitly on
the role of capital markets in facilitating the downward spiral.35
However, they do rely on capital market valuation implicitly as a
basis to assess the race.36 The “race to the bottom” camp argues that
corporate lawyers look out for corporate managers as both benefit
from a regime that entrenches management at the expense of
shareholders.37 “Race to the bottom” proponents predict embracing
Delaware corporate law will depress the stock price as the market
applies a Delaware discount that reflects managerial entrenchment.38
As a result, the “race to the bottom” approach also implies that
financial markets price corporate law, a premise that can also be
empirically tested.
Therefore, the debate largely boils down to whether Delaware
actually has better corporate law than other states, where “better” is
assessed by value in capital markets. A number of empirical studies
have attempted to assess the value of Delaware law using stock price
data.39 The earliest studies took the most intuitive route, conducting
event studies around reincorporations, transactions whose sole
purpose was for a corporation to change its state of incorporation

adds value); Fischel, supra note 2, at 919–20 (pointing to the greater market valuation of
Delaware versus non-Delaware firms in arguing that “Delaware has achieved its
prominent position because its permissive corporation law maximizes, rather than
minimizes, shareholders’ welfare”); Romano, supra note 2, at 265–73 (arguing that the
positive market reaction to reincorporations in Delaware suggests that state competition
results in a “race to the top”); Subramanian, supra note 2, at 33–38 (showing that
Delaware law adds a modest, though declining amount of value at best).
35. See, e.g., Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 137–40 (developing a formal model that
suggests that Delaware law systematically favors managers over shareholders in contexts
in which their interest conflict); Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation, supra note 3, at
1440–45 (arguing that state competition leads to rules biased in favor of managerial
interests); Cary, supra note 3, at 665–66 (sparking the debate on the efficiency of
Delaware law by arguing Delaware was leading a “race for the bottom”); Eisenberg, supra
note 3, at 209–11 (arguing for the need to reexamine corporate law to remedy rules that
favor managers at the expense of shareholders); Kaplan, supra note 3, at 885–87 (framing
Delaware as leading a “race of leniency” towards management).
36. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, supra note 3, at 1780–83 (providing empirical evidence that state competition
results in corporate governance rules that benefit managers but potentially at the expense
of shareholders).
37. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 556–57.
38. See Romano, supra note 2, at 229–30.
39. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II:
Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 385–87 (2002)
(providing an overview of empirical studies that have sought to assess the value added by
Delaware law).
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from one state to another.40 The premise of these studies was that if
financial markets value Delaware law relative to the law of other
states, not only would this fact motivate reincorporations in
Delaware, but financial markets also should show positive stock price
effects upon reincorporation in Delaware.41 In contrast, if financial
markets value other states’ law over that of Delaware, the financial
markets should show negative stock price effects upon
reincorporation in Delaware.42
The reincorporation studies are mixed but generally show at
least nonnegative market reaction to the decision to reincorporate in
Delaware.43 Some show small positive effects from reincorporating in
Delaware.44 Other studies show effects that depend on the motivation
of the reincorporation, with reincorporations designed to erect
takeover defenses producing negative returns and other types of
reincorporations producing positive returns.45 Overall, the results
from the reincorporation studies suggest “modest” returns at best
from reincorporation in Delaware.46 But taken together with the large
number of studies that show no effect or a mixed effect, the studies

40. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
17–24 (1993) (providing an analysis of various event studies bearing on state competition).
41. See id. at 17.
42. See id.
43. Reincorporation studies often rely on the fact that the overwhelming majority of
reincorporations are to Delaware to make their case that Delaware must be adding value.
See, e.g., Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: ‘Unhealthy
Competition’ Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 59, 62–63 (1980) (documenting that
90% of reincorporating firms from 1927 to 1977 chose Delaware); Romano, supra note 2,
at 244–45 (observing that 81% of reincorporations from 1961 to 1983 chose Delaware).
But see Subramanian, supra note 2, at 34–37 (finding that during the 1990s, Delaware’s
share of reincorporations declined to only 56% of reincorporations).
44. See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 66–67 (1989); Dodd & Leftwich,
supra note 43, at 62–63 (showing that most of the abnormal returns for a reincorporating
firm occurred before the reincorporation event date); Romano, supra note 2, at 240–43
(confirming this finding). Other studies show positive and negative results from
reincorporations based on the managements’ stated motives. See, e.g., Pamela Peterson,
Reincorporation Motives and Shareholder Wealth, 23 FIN. REV. 151, 155–59 (1988)
(showing that abnormal returns differed depending on the announced motivation for
reincorporation with modestly negative returns for reincorporations that had an
announced defensive purpose and positive returns for reincorporations that had an
express purpose of enhancing shareholder value).
45. See Randall A. Heron & Wilbur G. Lewellen, An Empirical Analysis of the
Reincorporation Decision, 33 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 549, 555–58 (1998).
46. See Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, supra note 3, at 1792 (arguing that “even if the positive abnormal stock price
reaction [from reincorporations] is entirely due to the benefits of Delaware incorporation,
these benefits appear to be rather modest”).
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provide mostly inconclusive results or no large effects of Delaware
law.47
The reincorporation studies, in addition to providing weak
evidence for Delaware’s value, suffer from significant methodological
drawbacks. The principal problem is that the reincorporation decision
is itself the object of managerial choice, creating an endogeneity
problem.48 In other words, the decision to reincorporate may be
interpreted by the market as positive news for reasons completely
unrelated to any value placed on the legal regime. For example,
corporations may reincorporate in anticipation of major transactions,
such as a public offering, a major acquisition campaign, or defensive
maneuvering as Roberta Romano’s research showed.49 Thus, the
market might react to the potential signaling effects rather than the
news that the legal regime will change, confounding the analysis of
the value of Delaware law. Additionally, the small number of
reincorporations is evidence against Delaware adding value. The fact
that most non-Delaware corporations do not reincorporate into
Delaware and yet continue to compete effectively suggests that
Delaware’s value is marginal at best in adding value to managers or
shareholders.50
The recognition of problems with the reincorporation event
study approach led to an alternative approach using Tobin’s Q.
Tobin’s Q is a measure of the ratio of the market value of a firm’s
assets to the replacement cost of its assets.51 The higher the Tobin’s Q,
the greater value that managers have created relative to firm assets,
and the lower the Tobin’s Q, the more ineffective the management
has been in creating value from firm assets.52 In 2001, Robert Daines

47. For an overview of event studies on reincorporation, see ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 64–73
(2002).
48. See Yair Listokin, Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Corporate
Governance, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 90, 94–97 (2008) (explaining how corporate
governance analyses may be skewed due to the confounding effect of endogeneity
problems).
49. See Romano, supra note 2, at 233–36.
50. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 15, at 478 (“Either Delaware reincorporation
does not produce gains for all firms or firms refusing to relocate do not disappear, for
though Delaware is successful in attracting and retaining corporate charters, many
corporations continue to thrive under charters granted by other states . . . .”).
51. See Kee H. Chung & Stephen W. Pruitt, A Simple Approximation of Tobin’s Q, 23
FIN. MGMT. 70, 70 (1994).
52. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 236 n.20 (2002).
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employed this new approach to assess the value of Delaware law.53
Daines found that Delaware companies had significantly larger values
of Tobin’s Q than companies incorporated in other states.54 The effect
was not just statistically significant but economically consequential as
well, ranging from a 1% to 5% increase in market value, depending
on the years chosen.55
The Daines article reinvigorated the debate over the value of
Delaware law. But the fact that the value of Delaware law appeared
to vary so much from year to year cast doubt on the robustness of the
results themselves56 and raised the question as to whether any
Delaware effect that once existed had now “disappeared.”57
Moreover, the Tobin’s Q studies may also suffer from a selection bias
of their own, since incorporation decisions are not random, and
Delaware corporations may vary from other corporations in
systematic ways that cause the Tobin’s Q result.58 For example, if
growing companies choose Delaware or if Delaware companies are
more conservative with financial statements, their Tobin’s Q could be
higher, even though corporate law does not cause the increased value.
Similarly, stronger management teams may tend to choose Delaware
and therefore have higher performance that could account for results
that have nothing to do with the substance of Delaware law.59

53. See Daines, supra, note 2, at 532–35. The new approach has caught on, as even
critics of Daines’ conclusions have used this framework in subsequent articles analyzing
other governance issues. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of
Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 411–13 (2005) (using Tobin’s Q as a measure of
firm value in an analysis of the association between staggered boards and firm value).
54. See Daines, supra note 2, at 533–34.
55. See id.
56. See Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, supra note 3, at 1785–86 (documenting how Daines’ “reported correlation between
Tobin’s Q and Delaware incorporation no longer exists”).
57. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 391; Guhan Subramanian, The
Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race”
Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1797–1802 (2002). See
generally Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Whither Delaware? Limited Commitment
and the Financial Value of Corporate Law (Nov. 24, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2519238 (using a Tobin’s
Q approach and finding that Delaware law has no positive value to the capital markets
and may have a negative value).
58. See Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, supra note 3, at 1788–90 (discussing the influence of selection effects on the Daines
results).
59. Indeed, Tobin’s Q is often deployed in empirical research as a dependent variable
assessing firm performance. See, e.g., Birger Wernerfelt & Cynthia A. Montgomery,
Tobin’s Q and the Importance of Focus in Firm Performance, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 246, 247
(1988).
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The two existing methodologies for estimating the value of
Delaware law each have their advantages and disadvantages. The
reincorporation approach avoids the danger of selection effects from
better management teams systematically choosing to incorporate in
Delaware because the technique compares the same company and
management before and after reincorporation. But reincorporation
studies are subject to the criticism that other possibly confounding
events typically accompany reincorporation, and those events could
cause the price increases. The Tobin’s Q studies do not have the
problem of confounding events accompanying the reincorporation
decision because there is no reincorporation decision. But the Tobin’s
Q studies compare one group of companies to another, and those
companies may differ in systematic ways not caused by the law of the
state of incorporation. In short, both of the leading methodologies
suffer from significant methodological weaknesses and have produced
results that are both conflicting and indeterminate.
II. EMPIRICALLY TESTING THE BASIS FOR DELAWARE’S APPEAL
A. The Merger Reincorporation Test
In light of the limitations of existing approaches, we developed a
new approach for valuing Delaware law to shed light on the “race to
the top” or “race to the bottom” debate in corporate law.”60 Our
merger reincorporation test leverages the little-appreciated fact that
every merger of companies incorporated in different states entails an
“acquisition reincorporation” of the target company. In a merger, the
assets and liabilities of the target corporation become the assets and
liabilities of the acquiring corporation. As a result, the target
corporation’s assets are redeployed from the target corporation’s
regime of corporate law into the surviving corporation’s regime of
corporate law. In this sense, the business and assets of the target
company are “reincorporated” in the state of incorporation of the
acquiring company. If assets are redeployed from an inferior regime
of corporate law to a superior one, this change should increase the
value relative to mergers in which assets are redeployed from a

60. There are other approaches to evaluating the value of Delaware law, such as
looking at market reactions to changes in law, see, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J.
White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors’ Reactions to “Changes”
in Corporate Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 551, 554–58 (1987), as well as the performance of
firms after reincorporation. For an overview of these approaches, see Sanjai Bhagat &
Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 945, 946–51 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
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superior regime to an inferior regime, or mergers where the target
and acquirer regimes are the same.
Our merger reincorporation approach makes it possible to
harness some of the benefits of the reincorporation methodology
while reducing the endogeneity problems inherent in the
reincorporation studies. Previous studies focused on “freestanding”
reincorporations in which the only (apparent) event was the
corporate decision to change its state of incorporation.61 As
mentioned above, simply looking at the returns to companies
reincorporating in Delaware raises significant confounding event
problems, because companies that reincorporate often do so in
anticipation of major corporate events, such as public offerings. Thus,
one cannot determine whether the stock price reaction is a response
to the reincorporation or to the major corporate events with which
this change is inextricably intertwined. The problem could be greatly
reduced if it were possible to reliably compare freestanding
reincorporations into Delaware with freestanding reincorporations
out of Delaware, but there are too few reincorporations out of
Delaware to provide reliable results.62 Our approach of using merger
reincorporations, however, allows us to overcome this problem by
comparing one acquisition against another acquisition. Because
companies merge into and out of Delaware in roughly equal numbers,
we are able to compare companies reincorporating into Delaware
with those reincorporating out of Delaware.63
This approach yields four types of merger reincorporations,
which we refer to as “merger counterparts,” that we can examine to
find the relative value of Delaware law: (1) a non-Delaware
corporation merges into a Delaware corporation, (2) a Delaware
corporation merges into a Delaware corporation, (3) a non-Delaware
corporation merges into a non-Delaware corporation, and (4) a
Delaware corporation merges into a non-Delaware corporation.64 If
61. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 2, at 265–73 (examining the role of state
competition in reincorporations).
62. See Heron & Lewellen, supra note 45, at 553 (noting that only thirteen percent of
reincorporations moved to a state other than Delaware). Even if there were sufficient
numbers of companies leaving Delaware, the lopsided direction of reincorporation
decisions would raise the risk that companies left Delaware for different reasons than
those that entered Delaware, raising further confounding issues. The differing reasons of
companies entering and leaving Delaware have been documented in the literature. See id.
at 560 n.7.
63. See infra Table 2.
64. For each transaction, we located the original acquisition agreement (typically, an
Agreement and Plan of Merger, even for tender offer deals) from the SEC’s EDGAR
database. We used the first paragraph of the acquisition agreement to identify the states of
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Delaware law increases firm value relative to the law of other states,
we would expect that Case 1 should yield the highest returns, as assets
under an inferior (non-Delaware) law would be reincorporated under
the superior (Delaware) law. Case 4 should yield the lowest returns,
because assets under the superior (Delaware) law would be
reincorporated under the inferior (non-Delaware) law.
Cases 2 and 3, in which both merging companies are Delaware
companies or non-Delaware companies, should fall in between Cases
1 and 4, but the expected returns need not be zero. When two
Delaware companies merge, there is no “reincorporation” because all
assets were deployed under Delaware law prior to the merger and
after the merger. But if markets value Delaware law, there may be a
positive element of value because the market “priced in” (i.e., had
taken account of) the possibility that the target could be acquired by a
non-Delaware company, and thus it is “relieved” that the assets
remain in Delaware. The reverse might be true when two nonDelaware companies merge. There may be a negative element of
value because the market priced in the possibility that the target
could be acquired by a Delaware company, and thus the market is
“disappointed.” Therefore, we would predict that if Delaware law has
positive value, the Delaware into Delaware mergers should give a
higher return than non-Delaware into non-Delaware mergers,
yielding the following ranking hypothesis:

incorporation of the buyer, seller, and merger subsidiary (if applicable). We then
identified the structure of the transaction from the recitals of the agreement or the body of
the agreement itself. In some cases, multiple entities and multiple jurisdictions were
involved, as in the case with real estate investment trust mergers, which often have a
merger of the publicly traded holding company and a merger of the privately held
operating subsidiary. We used the jurisdiction of the publicly traded holding company
rather than the privately traded subsidiary.
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Table 1. Predictions for the Delaware Value Hypothesis.
Direction of Merger

Expected Return

Case 1: Non-Delaware into Delaware

Highest

Case 2: Delaware into Delaware

Higher

Case 3: Non-Delaware into Non-Delaware

Lower

Case 4: Delaware into Non-Delaware

Lowest

To the extent that mergers follow the predicted pattern, one
would conclude that Delaware law holds positive value relative to the
law of other states (a “race to the top”). To the extent that mergers
follow the reverse pattern, one would expect that Delaware law is
worse than that of other states (a “race to the bottom”). If, however,
the cases do not follow either pattern or there are no significant
differences, one would conclude that Delaware is neither better nor
worse than other states and that Delaware’s appeal to lawyers and
corporate managers lies in something other than its ability to add
value.
B.

Data and Methodology

To examine the hypothesis that Delaware law creates value, we
created a data set initially consisting of all announcements of mergers
between public companies for the ten-year period between 2001 and
2011, inclusive with a “Total Invested Capital” of at least $250
million.65 We located these merger announcements using the
Mergerstat database available through LexisNexis. For each
transaction, we coded the state of incorporation of the acquiring
company and the target.66 The four merger counterparts (states of
65. The variable for “Total Invested Capital” in Mergerstat is a measure that takes
into account not only the target’s implied market value of common equity, but also the
face value of debt and the book value of preferred stock. See Factset Mergerstat/BVR
Control Premium Study FAQs, BVR, http://www.bvmarketdata.com/defaulttextonly.asp?f=
CPS%20Faqs (last updated Nov. 13, 2013). Thus, this is a proxy for the total “enterprise
value” of the target company. See id.
66. In many cases, the transaction was structured as a triangular merger. In such cases,
a merger subsidiary of the acquiring company is the entity that actually merges with the
target. See Rev. Rul. 1990-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67–69. Because the merger subsidiary is a
wholly owned subsidiary of the acquirer, corporate law is irrelevant to the merger
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incorporation) are the key independent variables we test in the
analysis.
The dependent variable of interest is the change in common
stockholder wealth of the combined companies before and after the
announcement date, i.e., the “excess returns” to common stock from
the merger. This test calls for a standard event study analysis with one
important change.67 To assess the value of Delaware law in interstate
mergers, we must measure the combined value of the two
corporations before and after the merger.68 We cannot merely look at
the acquirer stock price and the target stock price separately because
we do not know how the joint increase or decrease associated with
the legal regime will be shared between the acquirer and the target.69
If the surviving corporation’s state of incorporation is good or bad
relative to that of the target, then that might affect the price paid in
the merger.70 As a result, we estimate three separate versions of our
event study, one for the acquirer, one for the target, and one for a
value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target.71 The results
are presented in the next section.
subsidiary, so we treat the surviving corporation in such cases as the parent (acquiring)
company. Id.
67. An event study is a statistical regression analysis that assesses the market’s
reaction to an event, such as disclosure of information, by measuring the degree to which a
security’s price diverged in response to an event from its typical correlation to the stock
market. See, e.g., Bhagat & Romano, supra note 39, at 382–85 (discussing the appeal of
event studies in the securities law context because they provide a means to measure a
specific event’s impact on individual stock prices); Elaine Buckberg & Frederick C.
Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Demands and Remedial Offers, 63 BUS. LAW. 347, 361
(2008) (noting that courts widely accept event studies in a broad array of contexts such as
securities litigation); Madge S. Thorsen, Richard A. Kaplan & Scott Hakala, Rediscovering
the Economics of Loss Causation, 6. J. BUS. & SEC. L. 93, 95 (2006) (observing that the
event study method serves as “the gold standard” for loss causation for courts and
economists).
68. Market capitalization of the acquirer and the target were computed by multiplying
the share price of the relevant company on the fifth trading day prior to the
announcement date by the number of shares of common stock outstanding on that date,
each as reflected in the CRSP Daily Stock Files. The relative size of the target and
acquirer was computed by taking the ratio of the target’s market capitalization to the
acquirer’s market capitalization.
69. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., Do Tender Offers Create Value? New Methods and
Evidence, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 4, 7 (2005) (explaining that most event studies of mergers
estimate the effect on the acquirer and target separately, but that combined estimates are
necessary because overall gains “depend on how this surplus is divided between bidder
and target”).
70. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 139–42 (1999).
71. See Michael Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han Kim, Synergistic Gains from
Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and
Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 5–6 (1988) (conducting three separate versions of the
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The “event” in our event study is the official announcement of
the merger. We use the announcement date of the merger (which we
denote as T) as the “event” and use a window extending from one
trading day before the announcement date (T-1) to one trading day
after the announcement date (T+1) to capture leakage of information
before the announcement and errors in the reported announcement
date.72 We calculate the return for each of the targets and acquirers,
and the combined returns for the two companies. The combined
return for the portfolio of the two companies is based on a valueweighted portfolio of the two companies, following existing work in
financial economics.73 For example, if over the three-day event
window the target stock price increased by 40%, the acquirer stock
price decreased by 10%, and the target’s (pre-announcement) market
capitalization was one-third the size of that of the acquirer, the
combined return would be positive 2.5%.74 This approach is designed
to measure the net wealth percentage created or destroyed over the
event window for the target and acquirer.
Following standard event study methodology, we subtract the
estimated “normal” return over the period from the actual return
calculated above. To estimate normal returns for the target, the
acquirer, and the combined portfolio, we use the market model with
the value-weighted market portfolio from the Center for Research in
Securities Prices (“CRSP”)75 serving as the “market.” We estimate
normal returns over the trading days in the period T-201 to T-6 using
the market model regression76:
event study for the target, acquirer, and both the target and acquirer to measure merger
synergies).
72. In a number of cases, the announcement was made after the market’s close. In
such cases, the price cannot react until the next trading day. Therefore, including one
trading day after the announcement date ensures that the price reaction is captured in the
event window.
73. See Bradley et al., supra note 71, at 9.
74. The calculation is performed by calculating the product of the acquirer’s market
capitalization percentage of the combined company (here 75%) and the acquirer’s stock
price reaction (here -10%) and adding that product to the product of the target company’s
market capitalization percentage of the combined company (here 25%) and the target
company’s stock price reaction (here +40%), which is -0.075 + 0.1 = 0.025 or +2.5%. We
calculate the value weights of each acquirer and target company as of five trading days
prior to the announcement date (T-5).
75. Wharton Research Data Services, WHARTON UNIV. PENNSYLVANIA, http://wrdsweb.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (subscription required).
76. In this regression, Rit is the return for company i on day t and Rmt is the return to
the value-weighted market portfolio. εit is the disturbance term, which is a normal random
variable with zero mean. See JOHN Y. CAMPBELL, ANDREW W. LO & A. CRAIG
MACKINLAY, THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 150–55 (1996) (describing
the basics of the market model event study methodology).
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Rit  i  i Rmt   it
The abnormal returns are therefore77:

ARit  Rit  aˆi  ̂ i Rmt
We then regress these abnormal returns on our key independent
variable of interest, the type of merger counterpart, which is given by
dummy variables for Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3, with Case 4
constituting the baseline case. These Cases categorize the mergers
according to whether a non-Delaware company merged into a
Delaware company (Case 1), a Delaware company merged into
another Delaware company (Case 2), a non-Delaware company
merged into another non-Delaware company (Case 3), or a Delaware
company merged into a non-Delaware company (Case 4). The
coefficient for Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3 may therefore be thought of
as the value created or destroyed in that case relative to the baseline
case of a Delaware company merging into a non-Delaware company.
If Delaware law is more valuable than that of other states, we would
expect the coefficients on each of Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3 to be
positive, because the baseline Case 4 is predicted to have the lowest
returns under the Delaware value hypothesis.
We also collected a number of control variables for use in the
regression analysis. The existing studies make it clear that we must
distinguish between cash mergers and stock mergers.78 These studies
have documented that the bidder’s returns are higher in cash deals
than in stock deals. Other studies have documented that the target’s
returns are also higher in cash deals.79 Thus, the existing literature has
clearly shown that cash deals create more value for both acquirer and
target, and therefore cash deals are a potential confounding effect in
this study.80 If companies incorporated in one state tend to use cash or

77. See id.
78. See, e.g., Nickolaos G. Travlos, Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment,
and Bidding Firms’ Stock Returns, 4 J. FIN. 943, 946–51 (1987).
79. See Yen-Sheng Huang & Ralph A. Walkling, Target Abnormal Returns Associated
with Acquisition Announcements: Payment, Acquisition Form, and Managerial Resistance,
19 J. FIN. ECON. 329, 332–34 (1987).
80. In addition, long-term performance seems to bear out the market’s price
reactions, as studies have found that cash deals outperform stock deals. See, e.g., Tim
Loughran & Anand M. Vijh, Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit from Corporate
Acquisitions?, 52 J. CORP. FIN. 1765, 1770–74 (1997) (finding that stock acquisitions and
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stock more frequently than companies incorporated in another state,
we might mistake the “cash effect” for an effect of the state of
incorporation. We therefore include a variable to hold the cash
component of the transactions constant.
However, the deals are not simply either pure cash or pure stock.
There are a large number of transactions in which the consideration
was mixed—both cash and stock, especially approximately half cash
and half stock. We therefore include a variable for the proportion of
the target consideration paid in cash.81 The proportions of cash used
in transactions are multi-modal rather than normal, with three distinct
peaks near 0% cash (i.e., all stock), 50% cash, and 100% cash. We
trichotomize this variable into dummy variables based on whether the
cash consideration was less than one-third, between one-third and
two-thirds, or greater than two-thirds. This approach reduces the
distortion risk from the extreme non-normality of the variable.
We also include a control variable for the size of the target
relative to the size of the acquirer, as well as the logged size of each of
the target and acquirer. We use the market capitalization of the target
and acquirer five trading days prior to the announcement date (T-5),
where the market capitalization of each company is measured by the
number of shares of common stock outstanding multiplied by the
closing price on that date.82 The variable for relative size of the target
and acquirer included in the regression is the market capitalization of
the target on T-5 as a proportion of the combined market
capitalization of the combined companies on date T-5. The variables
for the size of the target and acquirer individually are the logged
market capitalizations of each company.
We also include one control for the type of industry. At least one
recent study shows that mergers between high-tech companies
produce significantly negative abnormal returns.83 Because high-tech
acquisitions carried out via merger do not perform as well as cash acquisitions or
acquisitions via a tender offer).
81. The data items for this calculation are taken from Mergerstat’s entries in the
“Stock Payment” and “Cash Payment” fields, which allow computation of the fraction of
stock used in the transaction. For information about the Mergerstat M&A Database, see
Source Information, LEXISNEXIS, http://w3.nexis.com/sources/scripts/info.pl?156282 (last
visited Apr. 9, 2015).
82. Companies with multiple classes of common stock are excluded from the analysis.
See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
83. See Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate Governance Transfer and Synergistic Gains
from Mergers and Acquisitions, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 829, 840–41 (2008). We follow the
authors’ characterization of “high-tech combinations” by using the classifications in Tim
Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed over Time?, 33 FIN. MGMT.
5, 35 (2004).
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firms are disproportionately incorporated in Delaware compared to
other types of firms, failure to include this variable could bias our
results.84 Thus, we include a dummy variable for “high-tech
combinations” as defined in that study.85
Finally, we include variables encoding the legal structure of the
transaction. We include a dummy variable indicating whether the
transaction involved a tender offer acquisition structure, as some
early studies have suggested greater returns from acquisitions
structured as tender offers.86 In our data, 105 deals (approximately
17%) were structured as tender offers. We also include a variable for
whether the transaction is structured as a direct merger, reverse
triangular merger, or forward triangular merger.87 In our data, 415
deals (approximately 65%) were reverse triangular mergers, 100
(approximately 16%) were forward triangular mergers, and 100
(approximately 16%) were direct (statutory) mergers. The remaining
handful had other structures or left the acquisition structure open.
In addition to including the control variables described above, we
also excluded a number of transactions from the analysis. First, we
included only deals involving an actual acquisition agreement, which
excluded Mergerstat items described as rumors, letters of intent, mere
proposals, or offers. In such cases, the date of “announcement” is
often ambiguous, making it difficult to assess the market’s response to
the announcement without a large event window. We excluded
acquisitions of companies in bankruptcy and hostile acquisitions
because in such cases, factors other than state of incorporation are
likely to drive price fluctuations of the acquirer and target. We also
excluded reorganizations of already related companies into a holding
company structure because in such cases, multiple sister companies
are simply being integrated into a single holding company.
We also excluded transactions involving certain categories of
companies because of data limitations. We included only transactions

84. See Wang and Xie, supra note 83, at 856.
85. See id.
86. See, e.g., Travlos, supra note 78, at 18–21 (discussing the early studies suggesting
tender offers had higher returns but demonstrating that the higher returns were
attributable to the form of payment rather than the tender offer itself).
87. A reverse triangular merger is a process by which the acquiring corporation
creates a subsidiary corporation, which is merged into the target corporation so that the
target is the surviving corporation. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM,
MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 5 (2003). A forward,
or straight, triangular merger is a process by which the acquiring corporation creates a
subsidiary corporation and the target corporation is merged into the subsidiary
corporation so that the subsidiary is the surviving corporation. Id.
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between a publicly traded acquirer and a publicly traded target when
both companies were listed on a U.S. stock exchange and stock price
data was available on CRSP. This approach allowed us to assess the
impact of the announcement on the combined market value of the
two companies. We excluded companies with multiple classes of
common stock outstanding because such companies tend to have one
or more of the classes of stock that is not publicly traded or otherwise
not comparable with price data.88 We also applied a floor of $250
million to the target’s enterprise value so that adequate price data
would be available.89 Finally, we also excluded a variety of other
companies for which price or other relevant data was missing.
The exclusions narrowed the 1,887 total transactions in
Mergerstat to 635 applicable deals.90 The largest category of the
excluded deals (666 total) was the category of deals in which stock
price data was not available for the acquirer because it was private
(e.g., private equity acquirers) or traded only on foreign exchanges. In
such cases the market price reaction of the acquirer cannot be
ascertained from our CRSP data.
The states of incorporation of the targets and acquirers for the
deals retained in the data are set forth in Table 2 below. The Table
shows that there are more Delaware than non-Delaware companies in
the data, both among targets and acquirers. Moreover, Delaware
companies tend to acquire other Delaware companies
disproportionately to non-Delaware companies, whereas nonDelaware companies acquire Delaware and non-Delaware companies
in roughly equal proportions. In the next Part, we analyze the results
of our analysis for these 635 transactions.

88. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1549, 1568–69 (2004) (explaining the rationale for excluding stock with multiple
classes from analyses of mergers because of the problem of valuing dual-class shares with
higher voting rights).
89. The use of this capital threshold was designed to ensure informational efficiency—
i.e., the existence of a large enough market for the security such that prices fully reflect the
publicly available information. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review
of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 387–88 (1970).
90. The largest exclusion was of private acquirers. The exclusion of transactions
involving privately held firms is an unfortunate necessity for our empirical analysis due to
the fact that we cannot determine the value of privately held entities due to the absence of
public disclosures. But there is no reason to believe that any plausible value added (or
lost) due to Delaware law would be any different for private rather than public companies.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (2015)

2015]

THE DELAWARE DELUSION

1077

Table 2. States of Incorporation of Acquirers and Targets.

Delaware
Target
Delaware Acquirer

Non-Delaware Acquirer
Total

Non-Delaware
Target

Total

257

113

370

140

125

265

397

238

635

III. RESULTS
In this Part, we present the results from our study. To provide
necessary background and to situate our results within the existing
literature, we first confirm and update the overall picture of merger
price reactions documented in previous studies. We then analyze the
key variable, the state of incorporation, to see whether the merger
reincorporations might provide a missing piece of the puzzle in
analyzing the wealth effects of mergers.
A. Placing the Merger Data in Context
Our empirical findings on the broad brush of market reactions to
mergers confirm and update many existing results within the law and
finance literature. This point is important because it underscores that
we are working with a representative cross-section of mergers and not
a cherry-picked data set with potentially skewed results. For example,
we find that target-stock prices rise, which the empirical literature has
long established.91 We also find that the acquirer usually has zero or
negative returns,92 which is consistent with what many (but not all)
other studies have previously demonstrated.93
91. See Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control:
The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 7–8 (1983).
92. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597,
623–29 (1989) (discussing how acquirer managers may systematically overpay for mergers
because of excessive optimism and ignorance about targets); Richard Roll, The Hubris
Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197, 200–06 (1986) (raising the hubris thesis
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We also confirm that the returns for both acquirer and target
depend greatly on the type of consideration offered in the deal, with
cash acquisitions resulting in dramatically greater returns for both
acquirer and target than stock acquisitions. We depict these results in
Figure 1 below.

In Figure 1, each line plots the abnormal return for either the
acquirer or target based on consideration paid in the merger over the
thirty-one-day trading window from T-10 to T+20. The solid line is
the return for the target in cash mergers; the dashed line is the return
to the target in stock mergers; the dot-dash line is the return to the

to explain the empirical observation that acquiring companies’ share prices tend to decline
when mergers are announced, suggesting that acquiring companies systematically
overpay). For an opposing view, see Mark Mitchell, Todd Pulvino & Erik Stafford, Price
Pressure Around Mergers, 54 J. FIN. 31, 33–37 (2004) (arguing that a large portion of the
declines in acquirers’ price is attributable to short selling by merger arbitrageurs and that
such declines tend to reverse themselves).
93. Compare Roll, supra note 92, at 200–01 (documenting that acquirers
systematically overpay), with Bradley et al., supra note 71, at 7–9 (finding that both target
and acquiring firms benefit from successful tender offers).
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acquirer in cash mergers; and the dotted line is the return to the
acquirer in stock mergers. Figure 1 makes it clear that the returns to
the acquirer are much lower than those to the target and the returns
to all parties are lower in stock mergers than in cash mergers. These
results are qualitatively similar to what other studies have found,
underscoring that we are working with a data set that is
representative of conventional mergers.
The finding that target-stock prices rise and acquirer-stock prices
often fall or remain flat following a merger announcement raises the
more important question of whether there are “excess returns” to the
combined portfolio of the two companies in the merger. In other
words, is the aggregate, value-enhancing effect of the merger positive
or do the acquirer’s losses outweigh the target’s gains? In conformity
with prior results in other studies, we find that the overall return to
the portfolio is very close to zero. The gains to the target companies
almost exactly balance and cancel the losses to the acquiring
companies depending on the type of consideration.
Figure 2 presents the results for the combined portfolio returns
over the same time period as Figure 1. The fact that the acquirer and
the target both have higher announcement returns in cash mergers
than in stock mergers, as shown in Figure 1, translates into greater
returns to the combined portfolio in cash mergers than in stock
mergers. Combined returns are significantly negative for stock
mergers and positive for cash mergers.94 This insight intersects with
another finance literature debate over the divergence in returns
between cash and stock mergers.95
The results described above lay the foundation for our analysis of
whether Delaware’s legal regime adds or detracts value from
transactions. The dramatic differences between cash and stock
mergers demonstrate that we must control for the type of
consideration to determine whether there is any Delaware effect for
each category or merger. In the next section, we conduct a crosssectional analysis that takes the cash-stock split into account to
determine the effect of Delaware law.
94. Our claims here approximate the relative combined gains for cash and stock
transactions, and are not designed to estimate the overall gains to mergers. There are
reasons why an event study approach such as ours might underestimate the overall gains.
See, e.g., Bhagat et al., supra note 69, at 8 (arguing that traditional event study methods
with short event windows will “estimate[] only a fraction of the full value effect of a
successful transaction”).
95. See Pavel G. Savor & Qi Lu, Do Stock Mergers Create Value for Acquirers?, 64 J.
FIN. 1061, 1068–72 (2009) (discussing the debate between stock and cash merger returns
and making the case that stock mergers yield higher returns than cash mergers).
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Cross-Sectional Analysis

In this section, we turn to the main variable of interest in this
study—the market value of the state of incorporation—and perform a
cross-sectional comparison of the abnormal returns to assess whether
reincorporating into Delaware law is valued by the financial markets.
The cross-sectional analysis is designed to isolate any potential
Delaware effect independent of the effects of cash versus stock
consideration, the size of the target or acquirer, the type of industry
of the companies involved, or the legal structure of the acquisition
(tender offer, reverse triangular merger, forward triangular merger,
etc.).
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 3, below. The
first column presents the results for the combined portfolio, the
second column presents the results for the acquirer, and the third
column presents the results for the target.
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Table 3. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Delaware Law.
Combined Portfolio
CAR

Acquirer
CAR

Target
CAR

-0.0020325

-0.003937

-0.010735

(-0.315)

(-0.499)

(-0.556)

-0.0093786

-0.011432

0.016014

(-1.639)

(-1.547)

(0.770)

-0.0035435

-0.006865

0.015924

(-0.511)

(-0.840)

(0.770)

Cash
Consideration
> 2/3

0.0205134*

0.028580**

0.017194

(2.504)

(3.056)

(0.644)

Cash
Consideration
< 1/3

-0.0170566*

-0.003406

-0.051304**

(-2.480)

(-0.461)

(-2.658)

State of
Incorporation
Variables:
Case 1:
Delaware
Acquiring
Non-Delaware
Case 2:
Delaware
Acquiring
Delaware
Case 3:
Non-Delaware
Acquiring
Non-Delaware
Consideration
Variables:
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Size Variables:

Relative Size
of Target

Log (Acquirer
Market Cap)

Log (Target
Market Cap)

0.0284714*

0.028333

-0.019515

(2.420)

(1.435)

(-0.766)

-0.0046997**

0.006576*

0.01894**

(-2.597)

(2.557)

(2.616)

0.0004065

-0.009389**

-0.039054***

(0.192)

(-3.055)

(-4.210)

0.0036771

-0.007834

0.064515**

(-0.625)

(-1.187)

(3.193)

0.0116249

0.019129*

0.006413

(1.525)

(2.464)

(0.282)

0.0041549

0.010823

-0.019737

(0.578)

(1.367)

(-0.767)

Legal Structure
Variables:

Tender Offer

Direct Merger

Reverse
Triangular
Merger
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Industry
Variable:

High-Tech
Combination

Intercept

2

Adjusted R

-0.0205376***

-0.02686***

0.009380

(-3.662)

(-3.823)

(0.532)

0.0992778*

0.005990

0.558575**

(2.216)

(0.126)

(2.907)

0.1156

0.1105

0.1361

Table based on 635 observations. Standard errors are
heteroscedasticity-consistent based on the H3 adjustment.96
T-statistics are provided in parentheses.

The key figures for assessing the value of Delaware
incorporation are those listed in the Table under the heading “State
of Incorporation Variables.” The variable labeled “Case 1” is the
estimate of the value created when a non-Delaware company merges
into a Delaware company compared to the baseline case when a
Delaware company merges into a non-Delaware company. This is
probably the most important variable for assessing the Delaware
value hypothesis as it directly compares reincorporation into and out
of Delaware. As the entry in Column 1 suggests, the coefficient is
very close to zero (actually slightly negative). This means that the
value created in Case 1 (which was predicted to be the highest value)
is estimated to be slightly lower than the value created in Case 4
(which was predicted to be the lowest value). The 95% confidence
interval is -.0147 to 0.011. Thus, although we cannot completely reject
96. Heteroscedasticity-consistency refers to confirming that there is no technical
defect in the degree of correlation between the size of errors and the size of the
explanatory variable, which would cast doubt on the precision of the statistical tests used.
See Michael O. Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1442, 1463–64 (1973).
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the hypothesis that Delaware has the slightest bit of positive value at
95% confidence, we can reject the hypothesis that Delaware has a
value greater than 1.11% (or less than -1.47%).
The other state of incorporation variables are similarly close to
zero, suggesting that none of them have any significant effect. This
lends further support to the conclusion that Delaware law does not
have value because none of the hypotheses that would be implied by
the “Delaware effect” is borne out. Indeed, none of the state of
incorporation variables is statistically significant, and all three merger
counterparts (Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3) are estimated to create less
value than Case 4 (i.e., the merger of a Delaware firm into a nonDelaware firm), even though Case 4 was predicted to create the least
value. Thus, although the state of incorporation coefficients are not
statistically significant, it is clear that the analysis provides no
evidence of capital markets valuing Delaware law. To the extent that
the estimates provide evidence of any Delaware effect, they provide
weak evidence of a negative effect.
The control variables for the combined company results in
Column 1 are largely consistent with expectations from the previous
literature, lending support to the robustness of our model and results.
Deals in which more cash was paid relative to stock have higher
returns for the combined companies and deals in which more stock
was paid relative to cash have lower returns.97 The size of the
acquiring company is negatively related to the combined returns in
the merger. The larger relative size of the acquirer compared to the
target is associated with lower returns.98 Combinations of high-tech
companies are associated with lower returns, as another recent study
also found.99 The legal details of the combination (forward triangular
merger, reverse triangular merger, direct merger, or tender offer)
appear to have little, if any, significance to the overall returns.
The results for the returns to the acquirer and the target
(Columns 2 and 3) also do not appear to have significant results
depending on the state of incorporation. Neither the acquirer nor the
target appears to capture larger gains when assets are shifted from
non-Delaware law into Delaware law, consistent with the overall

97. The lower returns associated with stock mergers could also be the result of
revelation of information about the bidder. See, e.g., Bhagat et al., supra note 69, at 5–6
(finding that the lower returns in stock mergers are the result of revelation of negative
information about the acquiring company).
98. See id. at 42 (finding that greater relative size of the acquiring company produces
lower combined gains in the merger).
99. See Wang & Xie, supra note 83, at 841.
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finding of no combined company value of Delaware law. At the same
time, the value created by shifting from Delaware to non-Delaware
law is not statistically significantly different from zero. In other words,
we find no evidence that that the state of incorporation matters to
financial markets either in terms of overall value created or in terms
of the split between acquirer and target.
The control variables are more interesting in Columns 2 and 3
because they suggest that although the variables are a wash in terms
of overall value creation, they may affect the split of the surplus
between the target and acquirer. Column 3 suggests that tender offers
imply significantly higher returns for the target company and may
imply slightly lower returns for the acquiring company. This fact
suggests that acquirers may overpay in such cases. Acquirers may
have larger returns when the target is larger relative to the acquirer,
as has been documented in existing research.100 Column 2 suggests
that the acquiring company has higher returns in the direct (statutory)
merger case than in the other structures, which is one of the few legal
details that appears significant in Table 3. Furthermore, in such cases
the target company’s returns are close to zero and the combined
effect in Column 1 is positive and close to statistical significance,
suggesting the possibility of some value creation in such cases. Finally,
the results indicate that acquisitions with cash consideration are
better for target, acquirer, and the combined companies, creating
more value than acquisitions with stock consideration.
IV. DISCUSSION
Our results show that financial markets do not place a positive
value on Delaware law. Companies constructively reincorporated into
Delaware do not appear to systematically produce more or less value
than companies constructively reincorporated out of Delaware, a
finding that strongly suggests both the “race to the top” and “race to
the bottom” views lack an empirical basis. Simply put, lawyers’
recommendations to incorporate in Delaware do not appear to add
value to either the corporations or the corporate managers the
lawyers serve. We also do not find much evidence that the markets
value the legal structure of the merger, except that tender offers
appear to produce higher returns for targets and direct mergers may

100. See Paul Asquith, Robert F. Bruner & David W. Mullins, Jr., The Gains to
Bidding Firms from Merger, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 121, 131–32 (1983) (documenting larger
acquirer returns for greater target size relative to acquirer size).
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produce higher combined returns. In this Part, we discuss the
implications of our results and anticipate some possible objections.
A. The Interplay of Financial Markets and Legal Decisions
A skeptic may question the wisdom of using financial markets as
the criteria for evaluating the legal decision of where to incorporate.
However, we follow a long line of studies using the financial market
reaction to the incorporation decision as the criterion for evaluating
that decision.101 A skeptic may still wonder whether the use of
financial markets as the measuring stick was simply driven by the
availability of financial market data. For this reason we need to
explain why we focus on how legal decisions are based on perceptions
of financial markets.
Part of the reason is that advocates and foes of Delaware have
put the degree to which Delaware incorporations add or subtract
value at the center of the debate for why lawyers and their corporate
clients choose Delaware. As discussed above,102 the dominant
methods for assessing the value of corporate law have centered on
market valuations of that law, and therefore our study uses the same
basic criterion.
The more important reason for focusing on financial markets,
however, is that lawyers themselves make an explicit causal link
between Delaware incorporation and financial markets’ reactions.
For example, a recent article used surveys of lawyers to conclude that
lawyers choose Delaware incorporation because of perceived financial
market preferences.103 Among the lawyers surveyed, the most
common reason given for recommending Delaware incorporation was
investors’ familiarity with Delaware law, which mattered far more
than most of the legal considerations.104 Thus, it appears that lawyers
are recommending Delaware incorporation because they believe the
financial markets demand it, when in fact our study shows that
financial markets are indifferent to the state of incorporation. In
effect, we argue that corporate lawyers labor under a fundamentally

101. See, e.g., Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 137–40; Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation, supra note 3, at 1440–45; Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?, supra note 3, at 1780–83; Daines, supra note 2, at 527;
Romano, supra note 2, at 265–73.
102. See supra Part II.
103. Carney et al., supra note 14, at 137 (arguing that “lawyers will choose Delaware
because of their belief that investors’ ignorance of other states’ laws means that the
investors will pay more for stock in Delaware companies”).
104. See id. at 143 tbl.4.
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mistaken assumption about the preferences of capital markets, a
potentially significant disconnect between law and finance.
This disconnect is possible because corporate lawyers appear to
operate on faulty assumptions about financial markets, and financial
market participants are abdicating the incorporation decision to
lawyers. In other words, the incorporation decision slips through the
cracks because financial market participants defer to lawyers, and
lawyers assume financial market participants would push back if their
assumptions about market reactions were flawed. The question of the
valuation of legal regime is one that both sides appear to have
assumed the other is responsible for. No professional is making a
conscious comparison among the fifty states for incorporation
decisions, and ironically, our data suggests it would not matter if they
had! This fact raises questions about why Delaware has enjoyed
enduring appeal as the default for incorporation. We will analyze the
most plausible explanations: network benefits, herding behavior, and
path dependency.105
B.

The Intertwining of Herding Effects and Path Dependency

Because our empirical findings show that Delaware does not add
value to public companies, it is important to understand what has led
a majority of companies to incorporate in Delaware. Delaware’s
dominance appears best explained through herding effects that reflect
the default decision-making of lawyers intertwined with path
dependence from Delaware’s past preeminence. Part of the problem
lies in the fact that corporate managers routinely defer to lawyers’
incorporation decisions in the context of IPOs, which suggests
lawyers’ logic or lawyers’ false assumptions about the value of
Delaware is at the heart of Delaware’s appeal.106 Empirical evidence
suggests that markets focus almost exclusively on the financial terms
rather than the legal terms of mergers.107 A related point may help to
explain why the choice of incorporation matters so little to managers
105. See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 761–63, 774–79 (1995) (making the case for the role of
network benefits to incentivize firms to incorporate in Delaware).
106. Lawyers, rather than corporate management, generally choose the place of
incorporation both at the time of the corporation’s birth and the initial public offering
stage, as this is one of many legal decisions companies routinely delegate to lawyers. See
Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1579–80
(2002); see also Romano, supra note 2, at 274 (discussing how reincorporation decisions
are typically motivated by lawyers rather than managers).
107. See Jeffrey Manns & Robert Anderson, The Merger Agreement Myth, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1145–48 (2013).
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that they allow their lawyers to choose the jurisdiction. The financial
terms are foremost in the minds of managers during mergers, and the
incorporation decision appears so insignificant to their bottom line
(and to markets) that this decision is simply a matter for lawyers to
resolve. Lawyers are naturally inclined to believe that this decision
matters to both their clients and markets, but this decision ultimately
does not add or subtract value for their clients.
Lawyers appear generally to follow a “herd mentality” in which
Delaware serves as both the clear default (that lawyers and/or clients
assume adds value) and the “safe choice,” which constitutes the path
of least resistance and effort. Part of the herding story may reflect the
intrinsic limits of corporate lawyers’ knowledge of state corporate
law. Lawyers steer clients towards incorporating in Delaware or (to a
lesser extent) towards the state in which the lawyers have their bar
training and experience. Lawyers make recommendations based on
their own limited knowledge or (as it has been put more bluntly) their
“ignorance” of law outside of Delaware and the state in which they
practice.108 In fairness to lawyers, this outcome is not surprising. Elite
law school students are primarily taught Delaware law in their
corporations classes, which fosters Delaware-centrism. This fact may
tip the scales even more towards choosing Delaware as a default for
incorporation as lawyers understandably steer clients towards the law
they know best. It would be surprising if lawyers frequently stepped
outside of their knowledge and comfort zone and took on the
challenge of understanding other states’ corporate governance laws
when they can rely on the Delaware default.
The bias from lawyers’ training and backgrounds results in a
landscape in which the overwhelming majority of incorporations are
in Delaware or in the issuer’s principal state of business (if their
lawyers are based in the same state).109 If the issuers’ and/or
underwriters’ counsel are local or regional firms, then their
knowledge and experience may tilt them towards at least considering
the state in which the company’s operations are primarily based. The
more national the firm and its clients, presumably the more likely it is
that lawyers may steer clients towards Delaware law as the de facto

108. See William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s
Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (making the case for “rational ignorance”
among lawyers who are familiar only with Delaware law and the law of the state in which
they practice).
109. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 420 (discussing the fact that less than ten
percent of publicly traded companies that are incorporated in a state outside of their
principal base of operations are incorporated in a state other than Delaware).
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national standard. This fact is understandable because most national
lawyers’ experience would entail dealing with Delaware corporate
law and so they would be most comfortable working within that
framework.110
The irony of the incorporation debate is that incorporation
decisions may ultimately be a product of mutual abdication of lawyers
and financial advisors. Lawyers may choose Delaware because they
believe investors are more familiar with the law. But no one in the
process is actually familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of
Delaware law vis-à-vis the law of other states.111 For example, a recent
survey found that over ninety-five percent of underwriters’ and
issuers’ counsel declared they were not comfortable incorporating in
an issuer’s home state unless the lawyers practiced law in that state.112
This fact underscores the herding story that appears to lead to issuers
primarily incorporating in Delaware or in their home state (if their
legal counsel happens to be based in that state). But the question of
whether Delaware actually adds or subtracts value for their client
simply does not appear to factor into lawyers’ analysis.
Part of the problem is that lawyers may receive no benefit from
conducting the due diligence to figure out what state corporate
governance framework (if any) is most favorable to their client. The
costs of mastering multiple state corporate frameworks may far
outweigh any prospective gains compared to falling back on the
Delaware default they are most familiar with. That being said,
lawyers may genuinely believe they are doing what is best for their
110. The best way to explain the divergence between companies that embrace
Delaware and those that choose another state (generally their state of origin) is to
examine the size and nature of corporations’ outside counsel and their primary method of
financing. Companies that choose to go the IPO route typically take on large national
firms whose lawyers would push for the conventional default. Smaller firms would likely
go with smaller, regional or local law firms who would push their comparative advantage
in understanding the corporate law of the jurisdiction in which they are based. This
decision would reinforce the lawyers’ ties to the firm and raise (at least modest) barriers to
entry to migrate to larger firms since the local lawyers could quite plausibly claim to be
stronger experts on their state-of-operations’ law. A related point is the nature of
financing. Companies that focus on self-financing through free cash flow would have less
of a need to rely on national firms as counsel. In contrast, companies reliant on capital
markets would be more likely to use the white shoe law firms and in turn, receive pressure
to follow the large law firm default of Delaware. It is possible that firms choose to
incorporate outside of Delaware for other reasons, such as the desire to have favorable
state regulators in other spheres that may be tied to the incorporation decision. For
example, an insurance company may view its incorporation decision as a vehicle for
choosing the most deferential state regulator, which may be of far more value to the
company than any marginal gain (or loss) from choosing Delaware.
111. See Carney et al., supra note 14, at 134.
112. See id.
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client in choosing Delaware. The perception that there are differences
in the quality of Delaware law relative to other states likely exists in
the present because of the high percentage of firms that have
incorporated in Delaware. Therefore, lawyers may believe pushing
their clients to follow the herd to Delaware is in their clients’ interest.
But like many actors in the financial world, lawyers may be taking the
easy way out by embracing group-think. To them, Delaware is an
appealing incorporation destination because many companies
incorporate in Delaware, whether or not it actually enhances value.113
Lawyers can and do routinely pitch Delaware as the default that
markets would expect an IPO candidate to be in, and they can
therefore sustain the self-fulfilling prophecy that Delaware is the state
of choice.114
The choice to incorporate in Delaware also appears to be a
product of risk aversion. Most lawyers offer the advice about
incorporation that they believe other lawyers will offer. They have
nothing to gain by risking their reputation for any alternative to the
conventional wisdom.115 In this way, Delaware’s dominance is the
product of ingrained path dependence as lawyers recommend
Delaware because past lawyers have recommended incorporation in
Delaware. Either lawyers believe the conventional wisdom must be
right, or they trust that by opting for the conventional wisdom, they
will not be blamed for making the wrong decision.116
The fallback story in defense of Delaware is that its role as a
default jurisdiction creates positive network effects and benefits.117
Just as companies converging on Blu-ray as the standard for movies
or MP3s as the standard for music may make it easier to sell movies
and music, having a primary default jurisdiction for corporate law can

113. For example, a recent survey found that over seventy percent of both
underwriters’ and issuers’ counsel advised clients to incorporate in Delaware for initial
public offerings. See id.
114. See id. at 132 (“[L]awyers may not offer a solution to the problem of Delaware’s
puzzling persistence. They may be much of the cause.”).
115. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 290–91 (1984) (discussing lawyers’ roles as “reputational
intermediaries,” which gives lawyers incentives to maintain a trustworthy reputation to
keep and grow their business).
116. See, e.g., Daines, supra note 106, at 1571 tbl.2 (noting that Delaware companies
accounted for fifty-six percent of initial public offerings from 1978–2000).
117. See Klausner, supra note 105, at 761–63, 774–79 (discussing the role of network
benefits in incentivizing firms to incorporate in Delaware); see also Bebchuk & Hamdani,
supra note 25, at 568–75 (discussing the potential network benefits from Delaware); Larry
E. Ribstein & Erin A. O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
661, 663–64 (making the case for network benefits from Delaware incorporations).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (2015)

2015]

THE DELAWARE DELUSION

1091

have appeal to lawyers and investors. Markets may have stable
expectations about what Delaware law does or does not bring to the
table in terms of shareholder rights and management entrenchment.
Lawyers may plausibly argue that choosing Delaware (especially at
the IPO stage) makes it easier for investors to understand what they
are getting into when they are deciding on whether to invest in the
company.
For example, one recent study made the case for Delaware’s
appeal as “lingua franca” among lawyers and investors and showed
parties are more likely to incorporate in Delaware when they are
based in different states.118 The logic is that Delaware’s preeminence
means that lawyers and investors are broadly familiar with the
features of Delaware law and that lawyers turn to this common
ground to establish clear expectations.119 Lawyers assume that market
participants will value Delaware and that this is a way to add value to
the transaction. However, our empirical findings suggest that these
network effects are marginal at best. Lawyers may tell each other
(and academics) this story to justify herding clients into Delaware
ostensibly for their clients’ own good. But this story appears rooted in
lawyers’ false assumptions and is not borne out by the reality of
market responses. Our study shows that network effects do not have a
substantial effect in adding or subtracting value from Delaware versus
non-Delaware companies. This fact suggests that herding among
lawyers is a more powerful driver of incorporation decisions than
lawyers’ insights about the benefits from choosing Delaware as a
default.
We concede that it is possible that Delaware once did offer a
premium of value to shareholders (whether out of perceptions of
adding value or the reality of maximizing shareholder or management
returns). That conclusion is beyond the scope of our decade-long data
set. Delaware may once have won a race to attract corporations, but it
now rests on its laurels. Other jurisdictions have either converged
with Delaware, or the distinctive aspects of Delaware have no impact
on enhancing (or reducing) the value of corporations.120 Alternatively,
markets may have once discounted companies incorporating in
118. See Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian Ibrahim, Delaware Law as
Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence 2–4, 21 (July 8, 2014) (J.L. & Econ., Forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117967 (finding that venture capital investors are
five percent more likely to choose Delaware incorporation when investing out-of-state).
119. See id.
120. One possibility is that all states have converged to the same rules as Delaware and
that the areas where they differ are not important to financial markets. It could be that
corporate law is trivial. See Black, supra note 14, at 586.
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Delaware in recognition of the corporate shenanigans of
entrenchment that Delaware law permitted, but the reality of the last
decade is that this premium (or discount) no longer applies. Instead,
Delaware’s dominance appears to stem primarily from its role as a
default jurisdiction that lawyers instinctively recommend without
having any empirical evidence or substantive reason for its appeal.
Delaware’s strength is the product of the intertwining of herding and
path dependence based on its past preeminence.
In fairness to Delaware’s proponents, we are not saying that
Delaware corporate law may not have advantages over other states.
For example, the speed with which Delaware courts resolve disputes
is valuable.121 Similarly, the specialized jurists in the Court of
Chancery are clearly preferable in a dispute over a judge who heard a
divorce yesterday, is hearing a corporate dispute today, and will hear
a murder trial tomorrow.122 Even if there are no benefits to
Delaware’s substantive law, it is still possible that there is a positive
value to the network effects of Delaware law.123 These advantages,
however important to lawyers, do not appear to matter to financial
markets that actually price companies’ securities.
V. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM AND EXPANDING COMPETITION
Our empirical findings raise the question of how to incentivize
managers and lawyers to scrutinize the value added by Delaware’s
corporate governance framework compared to that of other states.
The logic is that if companies or company shareholders have
incentives to assess the merits of corporate incorporation choices, it
will encourage Delaware and other states to compete to assess and
enhance the quality of their corporate governance law.
The dilemma is how to spur competition in a legal world
dominated by herding effects and default decision making while
imposing minimal costs. Breaking up herding effects is one of the
most daunting problems facing legal reform. Market participants have
strong incentives for embracing the conventional wisdom for fear of
the costs of being left behind or being exposed to greater scrutiny as

121. See Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance
and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1163–66 (2008) (discussing
the speed with which the Delaware Chancery courts adjudicate corporate law cases).
122. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1077–78 (2000) (discussing the virtues of the
distinctive specialization of the Delaware Chancery courts).
123. See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 105, at 761–63, 774–79.
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an outlier.124 Herding effects may drive lawyers towards Delaware
precisely because lawyers perceive that Delaware adds value and that
it is the “safe” choice. Although our paper shows empirically that
whatever appeal Delaware may have had in the past, Delaware does
not add value to companies in the present, so this fact may not be
enough to dispel lawyers’ deeply entrenched belief in Delaware or
even greater fear of making a mistake.125 The stickiness of reputation
and path dependence creates little incentive for Delaware law to do
more than the bare minimum to remain an incorporation magnet.126
Delaware’s hegemony is so dominant that the system of state
competition for corporate governance rules no longer functions in a
meaningful way. Herding and path dependence have combined to
create market failure, which requires extraordinary regulatory steps
to restore competition and incentives for innovation. The best
illustration of the extent of market failure is the shortcoming of
existing state efforts at competing with Delaware.
In theory, other states could restore meaningful competition to
Delaware simply by mimicking Delaware or creating more appealing
alternatives.127 Some states, such as Nevada, have tried to do just that
in tailoring corporate governance frameworks that largely mimic
Delaware.128 But it is difficult to replicate fully Delaware’s legal
institutions and their track record with which lawyers are familiar.129
There is a chicken-and-egg problem in attracting enough high-profile
corporations to establish a reputation of expertise and responsiveness
to changing circumstances that can rival the Chancery courts and the
Delaware legislature.130 Additionally, the start-up costs of another
124. See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the
Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 12–15 (2004) (discussing the pervasiveness of
conscious parallelism that facilitates coordination without express communication).
125. Delaware’s market power is underscored by the fact that its annual franchise fees
are dramatically higher than those of other states. See Carney & Shepherd, supra note 108,
at 63 (noting that franchise fees for comparable companies may be $100,000 in Delaware
compared to $5,000 in Georgia or as low as $40 in Kansas).
126. See id. at 4–6 (discussing Delaware’s longstanding dominance of incorporations in
spite of erosion of the quality of Delaware corporate law).
127. One would expect that other states’ laws would converge with Delaware’s law to
erode any advantage (leaving the stickiness of reputational capital as Delaware’s primary
advantage).
128. See Barzuza, supra note 14, at 949–50 (discussing Nevada’s efforts to attract outof-state incorporations by creating a more deferential regime to management but noting
that Nevada has attracted less than seven percent of out-of-state incorporations).
129. See, e.g., Bar-Gill et al., supra note 3, at 151–56 (discussing Delaware’s first-mover
advantage from investing in legal infrastructure).
130. See, e.g., Adam C. Pritchard, London as Delaware? 10 (Univ. Mich. L. Sch., John
M. Olin Ctr. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 09-008, 2009), available at
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state seriously attempting to take on Delaware’s dominance would be
high with a low probability of success at least for many years to
come.131
A. The Potential for a Federal Incorporation Option
For this reason, there is a need for a more significant exogenous
shock or regulatory shift to pave the way for more viable state
competition with Delaware. The challenge is how to develop credible
alternatives to Delaware.132 One strategy that could undercut
Delaware’s default dominance would be to create a federal
reincorporation option. Federal incorporation would create an instant
rival to Delaware by creating a national standard, direct access to the
federal courts, and a truly uniform common language among lawyers
that would be an easy choice for lawyers both to consider and justify
using.133 These network benefits would arise from the existence of a
federal incorporation statute regardless of whether an existing
institution, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, or a
new agency oversaw corporate governance issues. The federal
incorporation option would offer everything Delaware has to offer
(with the exception of precedents on corporate governance at its
inception) and would present lawyers with a credible alternative.
Politicians and policymakers have periodically flirted with the
idea for over one hundred years as a response to concerns about the
shortcomings of state corporate governance.134 Legislative rumblings
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407610 (arguing that Delaware’s appeal turns in part on the
large number of precedents that Delaware Chancery courts and lawyers can rely upon).
131. See Dent, supra note 26, at 505.
132. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 420 (noting that less than ten percent of
publicly traded companies that incorporated in a “foreign” state, i.e., outside of their
principal base of operations, incorporate in a state other than Delaware).
133. See Dent, supra note 26, at 507–11.
134. President Taft initiated calls for a federal incorporation statute over one hundred
years ago as a response to concerns about excessive corporate power. See 48 CONG. REC.
21, 23–24 (1912) (President’s Annual Message on Dec. 5, 1911 calling for a voluntary
federal incorporation law); 45 CONG. REC. 378, 381–83 (1910) (Message from the
President of the United States on Jan. 7, 1910 calling for a federal incorporation law);
Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE
L.J. 207, 231 (1926) (discussing President Taft’s calls for a voluntary federal incorporation
law with “provisions against over-capitalization and holding companies”). Since that time,
calls for a federal incorporation statute have resurfaced about once a generation. During
the 1930s, the debate for federal incorporation was part of calls for greater federal power
amidst the New Deal. See Harris Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation,
49 HARV. L. REV. 396, 397–98 (1936) (discussing the federal incorporation debate in the
New Deal context); Note, Federal Control over Corporate Distributions to Stockholders
Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 YALE L.J. 492, 493 n.3 (1940)
(discussing SEC and Federal Trade Commission studies on the potential for a federal
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about a potential federal incorporation statute have pushed Delaware
to improve the quality of its corporate governance in the short run to
forestall reform.135 The creation of lasting federal competition would
put pressure on Delaware continually to improve its corporate
governance regime.136
But the danger of a federal option is that it may prove to be more
than competition for Delaware and eventually swallow up the
incorporation market. Critics may be concerned that a federal option
would accelerate the creeping federalization of corporate governance,
which would gradually squeeze the state role in corporate governance
like a vine.137 If the federal option supplanted Delaware as the default
of choice, federal lawmakers may be tempted to tie an increasing
amount of strings attached to corporate status, which may transform
the corporate landscape far more than intended.
B.

The Case for “Shareholder Say” on Incorporation

Because of the downsides from creating a federal incorporation
option, we advocate an alternative strategy that would not unsettle
incorporation statute and related congressional bills that were proposed during the 1930s).
In the 1970s, the corporate scandals that led to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act also
spurred debate about the potential creation of a federal incorporation statute. See
Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980: Hearing on S. 2567 Before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
395–412 (1980) (discussing the possibility of a federal incorporation statute and the
preemption of state corporate governance laws); NADER ET AL., supra note 3, at 5–10;
Cary, supra note 3, at 672–73. More recently, concerns about the structural shortcomings
of corporate governance have led to renewed calls to consider a federal incorporation
statute. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover
Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 163 (2001) (proposing the creation
of an optional federal incorporation regime); Dent, supra note 26, at 507–12 (calling for
optional federal incorporation to be chosen by shareholders); Steven A. Ramirez, The
End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the
Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 347–58 (2007) (advocating the creation of a federal agency
to oversee a federal incorporation statute and lay out governance standards that
shareholders should be able to elect incorporation under a federal corporate law).
135. See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of
Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 629–31 (2004) (describing the debate over whether
competition among states for corporate charters has resulted in good or bad corporate
law).
136. The enactment of a federal incorporation statute would mark a significant
departure from reactive congressional action to corporate governance crises that occurs in
a piecemeal way, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2530, 2541 (2005) (describing how Congress only reactively deals
with corporate law issues when “constituents scream, fire alarms go off, and the media
spots a big issue”).
137. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, What Would Madison Think? The Irony of the Twists
and Turns of Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 53–55 (2009) (critiquing the increase in
the federal role in corporate governance).
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the longstanding balance between state corporate governance law and
federal securities law. Introducing “shareholder say” on incorporation
would seek to restore state competition to the incorporation market
by focusing the attention of corporate stakeholders on the potential
value added from changing the state of incorporation.138
Empowering shareholders to vote on affirming or rejecting the
state of incorporation would build on existing public company
mandates for shareholder votes on a range of corporate issues, such
as executive compensation and stock option plans.139 The potential for
shareholder votes would force corporate managers and lawyers to
justify the incorporation decisions they have made and to weigh the
merits of the alternative states of incorporation. The appeal of this
approach is that it is designed to mitigate an underlying principalagent problem in corporate governance by making managers more
accountable to shareholders about core corporate governance
decisions.140 It would empower the underlying owners to determine
whether to keep the existing state of incorporation or to require the
138. A more aggressive alternative strategy would be to require companies to rotate
their state of incorporation at periodic intervals (such as ten to twenty years). This
mandatory rotation approach would gradually erode the dominance of Delaware and give
states an immediate market to compete for. But the downside of this approach is that it
would impose changes on managers and shareholders regardless of whether their current
state of incorporation adds more value (or is perceived to add more value). While
Delaware’s dominance may be a product of market failure, empowering shareholders to
review and potentially veto the default decision making of managers and corporate
lawyers offers a better remedy to this principal-agent problem. Cf. Barbara Arel, Richard
G. Brody & Kurt Pany, Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality, 75 CPA J. 36, 38 (2005)
(discussing the mandatory rotation of individual audit partners from individual clients and
the broader arguments for and against audit firm rotation); Iris H-Y Chiu, Regulatory
Governance of Credit Ratings in the EU, 2013 EUR. J. RISK REG. 209, 217–18 (discussing
the merits of the European Union’s proposals for mandatory rotation of rating agencies).
139. As noted earlier, this approach could be achieved through a statutory change,
SEC rule, or an exchange-listing requirement. A statutory change or exchange-listing
requirement could be crafted to make shareholder say on incorporation binding on
management. In contrast, an SEC rule could lead to a nonbinding shareholder vote, yet
this approach would also place strong pressure on management to comply with the
shareholders’ wishes. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 5, at 698–99 (discussing stockexchange-listing rule mandates for public companies to secure shareholder approval for
stock option plans); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951(b),
124 Stat. 1899 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)) (mandating public
companies to hold advisory shareholder votes on the top five executives’ compensation at
least every three years).
140. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA.
L. REV. 1347, 1348–50 (2011) (discussing the potential for expanded shareholder voting
rights on major corporate decisions); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and
Its Political Economy, in Delaware and in Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013)
(describing the potential for proxy reform efforts to “revolutionize American corporate
governance”).
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company to change but would not mandate any changes if
shareholders are satisfied with the status quo. Proxy votes on the state
of incorporation would effectively function as a veto power, which
shareholders could exercise to check decisions that serve managers’
rather than shareholders’ interests.141
Skeptics may be concerned that shareholder inertia may prove to
be too strong to overcome.142 The decision on where to incorporate
typically occurs during the IPO process, which means that
shareholders will face a default choice. Defaults, however suboptimal,
have proven to be difficult to overcome in a range of legal contexts.143
For this reason, the efficacy of this approach would turn on the
participation of proxy advisory firms and institutional investors, who
are positioned to overcome the collective action problems facing
shareholders. Proxy advisory firms would add assessments of the
merits of state incorporation choices to the range of issues on which
they routinely make recommendations. Proxy advisory firms’ advice
on shareholder votes are widely followed by shareholders who often
need direction and lack the economic incentive to invest in making
informed choices on their own. Proxy advisory firms have wellestablished records in shaping shareholder votes on corporate
governance issues, which gives this proposal plausibility as proxy
advisory firms would be able to take the lead in assessing the value
added by states of incorporation.
Institutional investors would similarly have incentives to consider
whether the costs and benefits justify mobilizing shareholders to
change the state of incorporation. Institutional investors have the
economic stakes to invest in assessing the value added by a change in
the state of incorporation. As significantly, they play a key signaling
role to other investors to focus on this issue amidst the many other

141. See Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1324–27
(2013) (discussing how shareholders can be expected to exercise negative vetoes more
responsibly than to play a role in positive agenda setting for corporations); Robert B.
Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 149–50
(2009) (discussing how shareholder voting should occur to correct managerial errors,
which they define as decisions which diminish stock value).
142. See, e.g., Thompson & Edelman, supra note 141, at 130 (arguing that
“[s]hareholders seldom seem to care much about the vote even when they have it” and
often defer to the “Wall Street rule” even when they disagree with the management’s
decision).
143. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17–24
(2013) (discussing the role of inertia, endorsement, reference points, and loss aversion in
the durability of defaults).
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proxy votes that shareholders face.144 The “shareholder say” approach
would unlock the latent potential of these actors by giving them a
low-cost way to shape this important corporate governance decision,
while currently neither has a voice on this issue. Given the fact that
the costs of transitioning from one corporate governance regime are
low, this approach would provide a clear market-based test on
whether the value added of changing incorporation regimes is worth
it in the eyes of shareholders.
C.

Addressing Concerns About the “Shareholder Say” Approach

One concern about this approach is that shareholders may not be
sufficiently informed on how other substantive issues are intertwined
with a state of incorporation.145 For example, companies would balk
at a shareholder mandate to change the state of incorporation in
contexts in which the state of incorporation is tied to substantive state
regulation, such as for state-chartered banks or insurers. That being
said, these cases are the exception, rather than the rule, and proxy
advisory firms and institutional investors would be unlikely to support
changes in the state of incorporation when substantive regulatory
concerns are at stake. A related concern is that empowering
shareholders to change the state of incorporation would thwart the
will of managers who genuinely believe Delaware (or some other
state) is the optimal state of incorporation. While managers and their
lawyers may paternalistically believe they know best,146 the
shareholder say approach would create greater accountability to the
shareholder principals, and that power would presumably be
tempered by the sobering advice of proxy advisory firms and
shareholders’ self-interest as investors.147
Another critique is that there is currently no leading alternative
to Delaware for shareholders to choose, which may limit the potential
144. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962–64, 1970–72 (2010) (discussing the distinctive incentives
institutional investors face compared to retail investors).
145. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights,
53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 623–24 (2006) (discussing the concern that shareholders may not
be informed enough to exercise shareholder voting rights responsibly).
146. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power,
53 UCLA L. REV. 561. 565–69 (2006) (arguing that managers’ interests are actually better
aligned than shareholders’ for maximizing firm value); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical
Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 808–10 (2007) (questioning the
assumption that shareholder democracy is a good thing).
147. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675, 711–14 (2007) (acknowledging the currently limited scope of shareholder voting but
pointing to its potential).
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of “shareholder say” to foster state competition. While Nevada
attracts a modestly higher number of incorporations than the other
states “competing” with Delaware,148 every state is a “minnow”
compared to the Delaware “whale” in terms of incorporations. This
fact raises the specter of companies stumbling in the dark trying to
figure out which state is their best option. At first glance, that might
appear to be a significant concern because both corporations and
their shareholders may be slow to recognize and adapt to the
differences between corporate governance regimes. It is true that
there is a potential cost due to these uncertainties, but this concern
should not be overstated. The fact that almost half of American
public companies are not Delaware companies suggests both that
there are potentially viable alternatives worth consideration and that
investors could process future shifts in states of incorporation.
A related concern is that proxy advisory firms and companies
may rapidly cluster around a preferred alternative whose appeal is as
baseless as Delaware’s. A rush to find an alternative may tempt
lawyers to pick whichever state the first-mover leading law firms
appear to congregate around regardless of the merits. This herding
effect may swamp scrutiny of potential alternatives. There is no little
irony in the danger that herding may potentially dampen the impact
of a measure designed to mitigate herding effects. But the crucial
difference is that “shareholder say” on the state of incorporation will
focus more scrutiny on this decision by both insiders and outsiders
and make it harder for default decision making to go unnoticed. At
minimum, both company and proxy advisory firm lawyers would have
incentives to analyze the merits of the leading candidates simply to
explain the logic underpinning their decisions.
Another concern is that companies would face switching costs in
adjusting to the demands of a new corporate governance regime if
shareholders demanded a change in the state of incorporation. The
literal switching costs would be token both in terms of money and
time. Formally speaking, it is a simple process to incorporate from
one jurisdiction to another and entails relatively modest fees and
compliance with filing requirements. In fact, the premium that
Delaware charges for companies incorporated in its jurisdiction is
many times higher than its competitors, so in that sense there could

148. See Michal Barzuza, supra note 14, at 949 tbl.1 (noting that Nevada has attracted
less than seven percent of out-of-state incorporations).
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be substantial costs savings to transitions to another state.149 But the
real cost is more substantial both in terms of paying for lawyers to be
informed in the jurisdiction and to adjust corporate governance
institutions to an alternative regime. However, these costs could be
overstated. In many cases, it would not be the first time that a
company switched its state of incorporation, as companies frequently
switch from the primary state of business operations to Delaware as
part of the IPO process.150 In particular, small companies are more
likely to be non-Delaware companies, and many only become
Delaware companies when corporate lawyers steer them towards
Delaware during the IPO process based on the untested assumption
that markets value Delaware law. But firms rarely raise concerns
about the costs of reincorporation during the initial public offering
process, and they are unlikely to do so in the face of a shareholder
mandate for changing the state of incorporation.
VI. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
A. Assumptions Underpinning Analysis
Our study makes a number of assumptions in modeling stock
price reaction to merger announcements, which merit explanation.
Although most of our assumptions are standard in event studies and
extensively discussed in the literature, we address a few
methodological assumptions in this section and the reasons for those
assumptions. We then address potential confounding variables and
selection effects in the next section.
The first assumption is the event window, which is always an
important methodological choice that can affect the results of an
event study. There is a tradeoff in selecting the length of the event
window because a shorter window reduces noise and increases
statistical power, but it may not capture all of the effects that a longer
window would.151 Our study uses a short event window of three
trading days surrounding the merger announcement in which to
ascertain the market’s response to the constructive reincorporations.
One might argue that a longer event window would be preferable to

149. See Carney & Shepherd, supra note 108, at 63 (noting that franchise fees for
comparable companies may be $100,000 in Delaware compared to $5,000 in Georgia or as
low as $40 in Kansas).
150. See Daines, supra note 106, at 1576; Subramanian, supra note 57, at 1825–26.
151. See, e.g., Bhagat et al., supra note 69, at 8 (noting that a short event window
“minimizes . . . noise” but “estimates only a fraction of the full value effect of a successful
transaction”).
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capture all elements of value that might be related to the
announcement. But with daily data and relatively clear identifiable
event time (such as we have in our study), some scholars even
recommend a one-day window.152 Thus, we believe our three-day
window strikes the right balance between statistical power and event
date uncertainty. In fact, however, the exact choice of event window
made little difference as we estimated the model using event windows
of various lengths, and found some that gave positive estimates of the
value of Delaware law, although not statistically significantly different
from zero.
We believe that the three-day event window is appropriate for
our study for several reasons. First, unlike prior studies that
attempted to ascertain returns from both hostile and friendly offers,
we have limited our analysis to friendly offers which allows us to
pinpoint with much greater accuracy the date and time of
announcement. Second, we are not attempting to capture or estimate
all elements of value that arise from a merger as are most of the
articles on which we build. Instead, we only seek to capture the
market’s response to the change in state of incorporation. In an
efficient market, it is implausible that the market would take more
than one day to digest such a simple and readily available piece of
information.153 Furthermore, because we are not concerned with
estimating the magnitude or even directionality of overall combined
gains from mergers, but only the relative gains from acquisition
reincorporations, the fact that we may not capture the entire market
reaction in a short window does not pose a problem.
One might also question our inclusion of acquisitions of all sizes
instead of simply looking at mergers of equals or other acquisitions of
target companies that are significant compared to the size of the
acquirer. It is true that if the target company is very small compared
152. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 60, at 956 (“If one is using daily return data, an
announcement window of one day is quite feasible and the window that we recommend.
However, in going from one to two or three days, the loss in statistical power is not
serious.”).
153. Econometric practice broadly assumes that the semi-strong efficient market
hypothesis applies to stock prices. This well-established framework asserts that stock
prices immediately incorporate all publicly available information about the issuer, which
implies that the information in an acquisition agreement is incorporated into the stock
price on the trading day of the disclosure. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets:
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384, 413–16 (1970) (concluding an
empirical study with findings that the evidence supports the efficient markets model); see
also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 554–65, 642–43 (1984) (discussing the weak, semi-strong, and strong
efficient market hypotheses as tools for understanding stock price behavior).
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to the acquiring company, it would be much more difficult to detect
changes in the combined wealth effects of the two companies
attributable to the constructive reincorporation of the target.
However, when we limit our analysis to target companies that are
larger than ten percent of the combined target and acquirer, we find
that the value of Delaware law is actually more negative. Thus, our
modeling assumptions actually favor a finding of positive value in
Delaware law, yet we find no such value, which underscores the
significance of our findings.
B.

Potential Confounding Variables and Selection Effects

Our analysis is also subject to potential objections on the grounds
that selection effects or confounding variables or both could explain
our null results even if Delaware law had positive value compared to
the law of other states.154 Both the existing studies and our study on
Delaware law are bound to face challenges concerning potential
selection effects, as would any empirical study of corporate
governance.155 One of the common selection issues is that the effects
attributable to law may actually be attributable to new plans (e.g., the
reincorporation studies) or systematic differences among firms
incorporated in Delaware (e.g., Tobin’s Q studies). In this section, we
address some of the selection effects that might affect our study.
Any study that relates corporate governance variables with stock
price changes runs the risk of confounding management performance
with the variable of interest. Recall that one argument against the
result from Daines’ Tobin’s Q approach is that if better managers
choose Delaware and better managers also outperform the market,
then Delaware law could appear to have positive value when in fact
the positive value is attributable to better management teams. In our
study, one might make the opposite argument; that worse
management teams systematically choose Delaware companies and
that our failure to find a positive value to Delaware law is because
worse management offsets the value of the law. We find that

154. The concept of confounding variable is “[t]he presence of spurious association,
due for example to the influence of extraneous variables,” which may affect the variables
that the study is focused on and bias the study’s estimates and results. See JUDEA PEARL,
CAUSALITY 269 (Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 2009), available at
bayes.cs.ucla.edu/BOOK-2K/ch6-2.pdf.
155. See Yair Listokin, Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Corporate
Governance, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 90, 94–96 (2008) (discussing how endogeneity
problems pose challenges for corporate governance analyses).
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explanation unlikely, especially given the criticism of Daines on the
exact opposite ground.
Our study has other potential selection effects not present in the
Daines study because of our use of mergers as our data set. The
decision to use a database of mergers may tend to select some types
of target (and acquirer156) management teams over others. For
example, the target companies in this study might have better
management than average, given that they did agree to the merger, a
fact that shows less propensity for entrenchment. One might argue
that conditioning on the fact of a takeover selects better, less
entrenched target management, which if the market knew ahead of
time, would reduce the return from the takeover. If one further
assumes that good corporate law matters less for good managers (who
do not need constraints of corporate law), and if target managers are
disproportionately good, then the differences in corporate law could
be hidden in a database of merger transactions.
On the other hand, conditioning on takeovers might bias in favor
of underperforming targets, on the theory that a motivation for
takeovers is “disciplinary” or to improve underperforming firms in
the “market for corporate control.”157 The evidence for this is far
from uniform, however.158 For example, target companies in friendly
takeovers have similar characteristics to bidder companies in terms of
Tobin’s Q.159
Our study focuses on companies that actually did receive a
takeover proposal and accepted that proposal. Daines found that
Delaware firms were more likely to receive a takeover bid, and
interpreted that as at least part of the value added by Delaware.160
Daines argued that the market includes that as value for Delaware
companies.161 But this fact, if true, does not affect our analysis. If non156. See Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Do Managerial
Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN. 31, 33–34 (1990) (discussing how poor
managerial decisions can reduce the value of firms).
157. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 118 (1965).
158. See Anup Agrawal & Jeffrey E. Jaffe, Do Takeover Targets Underperform?
Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 721,
722 (2003) (showing that target firms do not systematically underperform when they are
assessed in a multi-year time horizon).
159. See Larry H. P. Lang, Rene M. Stulz & Ralph A. Walkling, Managerial
Performance, Tobin’s Q, and the Gains from Successful Tender Offers, 24 J. FIN. ECON.
137, 141–43 (1989) (presenting data suggesting that the Tobin’s Q was virtually identical
for targets and bidders in a sample of acquisitions).
160. Daines, supra note 2, at 542–46.
161. See id.
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Delaware companies are discounted because they are less likely to be
takeover targets, then when they actually are targets, more value
should accrue to those mergers than when Delaware companies are
targets. In other words, under the “race to the top” view, a Delaware
takeover should unlock additional value, but our results suggest this
assumption is baseless.
Another objection is that one might expect the test to have low
power because of the high variance around a merger announcement.
Individual mergers may have a wide range of market reactions as
some mergers may cause significant price spikes for targets (e.g., the
Alpha Natural Resources-Massey Energy merger), while others may
have minimal effects on targets (e.g., the Alcatel-Lucent or U.S.
Airways-American Airlines mergers). As discussed above, we chose a
large sample size and short event window specifically in order to
address potentially low statistical power in this context.162 But what is
noteworthy is that the variance of the combined return of both the
target and acquirer, however, is rather low, even for mergers of
equals. This fact suggests that our conclusions from an over-decadelong data set of public company mergers have broad explanatory
power.
CONCLUSION
It is indisputable that Delaware has won the race for corporate
charters and enjoys a virtual monopoly on the out-of-state
incorporation business.163 But the irony is that the fierce debate about
the “race to the top” versus “race to the bottom” has obscured the
reality that financial markets place no value on Delaware law. Our
innovative approach of analyzing the value added from Delaware and
non-Delaware mergers presents strong evidence that any claim of a
positive or negative effect from incorporating in Delaware is a myth
perpetuated by lawyers’ herding effects and path dependence.
We argue Delaware’s dominance stems from the fact that
lawyers largely choose the state of incorporation, which is generally a
matter of indifference to businesspeople and financial markets.
Lawyers appear to turn to Delaware because it is the law they know
best and because it is a safe default to recommend since most
companies are based there. Lawyers may assume Delaware adds
value (or that their clients believe Delaware incorporation provides a
162. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 60, at 955–56 (discussing sample sizes and
event window lengths in the context of statistical power).
163. See Carney & Shepherd, supra note 108, at 2–3.
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positive signal). But lawyers’ recommendations appear to have
nothing to do with whether Delaware law actually adds value
compared to other states’ corporate frameworks.
Delaware’s preeminence may be the result of the superiority of
Delaware law in the past, but our study shows that the markets place
no greater value on Delaware than other states’ law in the present.
Our results do not imply that Delaware’s virtual monopoly on out-ofstate incorporations has no value. The fact that so many large
corporations incorporate in Delaware may add marginal value due to
network effects. There may be a very small benefit to having
corporate lawyers cluster around a particular legal standard in
creating a common language and stable expectations. But the key
point is that Delaware does not need to be any better than any other
state to provide that element of value since Delaware’s dominance is
a product of lawyer herding and path dependency.
For this reason, we suggest there is a need to break up these
herding effects by creating “shareholder say” on the state of
incorporation. This approach would unlock the potential for change
by empowering shareholders to decide on whether to keep the
existing state of incorporation or to require the company to change.
This strategy offers a plausible way to address default decision
making as proxy advisory firms and institutional investors possess the
ability and the incentive to scrutinize managers’ incorporation choice.
As importantly, this regulatory strategy would spur lawyers to acquire
legal fluency in multiple corporate governance jurisdictions to justify
or challenge incorporation decisions and would incentivize proxyadvisory-firm and institutional-investor lawyers to cultivate this
expertise. This “shareholder say” approach would create
opportunities for states to compete to attract shareholder support and
would dampen the dominance of Delaware by restoring greater
competition among the states for incorporations.

